Saint Louis University Journal of Health Law & Policy
Volume 8
Issue 1 Health Care Reform, Transition and
Transformation in Long-Term Care

Article 8

2014

The Broken Promise of OBRA ’87: The Failure to Validate the
Survey Protocol
Malcolm J. Harkins III
Saint Louis University School of Law, mharkins@slu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/jhlp
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Malcolm J. Harkins III, The Broken Promise of OBRA ’87: The Failure to Validate the Survey Protocol, 8 St.
Louis U. J. Health L. & Pol'y (2014).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/jhlp/vol8/iss1/8

This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Saint Louis University Journal of Health Law & Policy by an authorized editor of Scholarship
Commons. For more information, please contact Susie Lee.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE BROKEN PROMISE OF OBRA ’87: THE FAILURE TO
VALIDATE THE SURVEY PROTOCOL

MALCOLM J. HARKINS III*
I. INTRODUCTION
Nursing facilities are among the most heavily regulated entities in the
American economy. Unfortunately, nursing facilities also are among the most
inconsistently and ineffectively regulated entities.
It is not a secret that government inspections of nursing facilities do not
result in valid, accurate, and consistent assessments of the quality of care. To
the contrary, decades of empirical studies and anecdotal evidence make the
point largely without contradiction.
Nursing home regulation is the modern-day analog of the fable in which no
one dares to mention that the emperor has no clothes. Politicians, regulators,
researchers, advocates for both nursing home residents and industry interests,
and courts—virtually anyone with an interest in assessment of nursing home
care—treat the results of the regulatory system as trustworthy—at least in so
far as such results conform to the speaker’s professional or political interests.
Numerous studies dating back to the 1990s collectively make four points
about the unreliability of nursing home inspection results. First, the inspection
process does not accurately determine whether a nursing facility is in
compliance with the substantive care standards established by federal
regulations. Second, the inspection process fails to appropriately and
accurately assess the seriousness of violations found. Third, inspection results
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are inconsistent. Fourth, there is no evidence that the inaccuracies and
variations in survey results are related to differences in quality.
To be sure, many investigators, especially in recent years, have asserted
that the regulatory system fails to identify instances of deficient nursing facility
care. Indeed, the problems of under-citation, as well as under-classification of
the seriousness of deficient practices, have been studied extensively. In fact,
the problems of under-citation and under-classification have been the focus of
studies of the inspection protocol in recent years. Although recognizing that
the survey process is systemically flawed, there is an implicit assumption in
such studies that the systemic flaws cause only over-citation and undercitation. There is no empirical evidence supporting that assumption, however.
Any viable effort to reform the nursing home regulatory system must start
by acknowledging that systemic flaws in the survey inspection methodology
and protocols result in both false-negative and false-positive findings. Such an
approach is mandated by law as well as common sense.
The Nursing Home Reform Act mandated that the assessment protocol be
“developed, tested, and validated by not later than January 1, 1990,” the date
on which the federal government was required to implement the new
assessment protocols and procedures.1 Initially, there was no doubt about the
meaning of “tested and validated.”
The Department of Health and Human Services’ Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) acknowledged that Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1987 (OBRA ’87) required that survey results must be both accurate
and consistent.2 According to CMS, “[a]ccuracy means not only that the
[survey] team has appropriately cited all deficiencies that existed, but also that
it has not cited a deficiency when no violation of a requirement has occurred.”3
“Consistent,” according to CMS, means that survey “results are consistent
across surveyors, and . . . that the enforcement actions precipitated by the
survey results are consistently applied.”4 “Inadequate survey performance” is
defined by regulation as “a pattern of failure to . . . identify deficiencies . . . [or
to] [c]ite only valid deficiencies.”5

1. 42 U.S.C. §1395i-3(g)(2)(C) (2012). The prior citation identifies the relevant provision
of the Medicare Act. The Medicaid Act contains requirements governing the survey and
certification process that are essentially identical to those in the Medicare Act. The majority of
those provisions are found at 42 U.S.C. 1396r. Because the language of the Medicare and
Medicaid provisions is virtually identical, in most instances, this article provides the citation to
the Medicare Act provisions only.
2. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Survey, Certification, and Enforcement of Skilled
Nursing Facilities and Nursing Facilities, 59 Fed. Reg. 56,116, 56,140 (Nov. 10, 1994).
3. Id. at 56,146-147.
4. Id. at 56,141.
5. 42 C.F.R. § 488.318(a)(1) (2014).
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OBRA ’87’s requirements that the survey methodology produce valid,
accurate, and consistent results was neither sui generis, nor was it a casually
considered suggestion. To the contrary, the requirement wrote into law one of
the three key recommendations of the landmark study, “Improving the Quality
of Care In Nursing Homes,” published by the National Academy of Sciences
Institute of Medicine (IOM) in 1986.6
The IOM study was ordered by Congress and commissioned by the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The IOM study was
undertaken after numerous efforts to reform the nursing home regulatory
system had failed, despite widespread consensus that the existing regulatory
system neither measured nor promoted quality of care.7 IOM was viewed as a
“fair broker” that possessed the expertise and credibility to reconcile the
competing interests and recommend a fair and balanced regulatory system.8
IOM made specific and pervasive recommendations for legislative changes
to the nursing home regulatory process. IOM compared the three components
of the regulatory process to the legs of a three-legged stool: “All are equally
important.”9 The three legs of the regulatory stool are: (1) the substantive care
standards; (2) the inspection methodology and procedures (or “survey”) used
to assess compliance with such standards; and, (3) the means of enforcing
compliance.10
IOM emphasized that the regulatory process could not be effective unless
the second leg—the methodologies and procedures utilized to assess
compliance with quality standards—was a reliable, valid, consistent, and
accurate means of assessing quality. The Report specified that the survey
protocol should be validated by “the findings of careful empirical studies,” and
that tests of the survey protocol should be “carefully analyzed for interrater
reliability in use of the instrument” because “[s]urvey findings must be valid
and reliable as well as consistent—they should be capable of determining the
extent to which a facility is in compliance with [Medicare and Medicaid
participation requirements].”11 The IOM Report similarly insisted that “[i]t is
essential to incorporate statistically defensible sampling procedures to achieve

6. All three of IOM’s recommendations were written into law by OBRA’87. The other two
recommendations addressed implementation of resident-focused substantive care standards and
improving the effectiveness of enforcement actions taken in response to findings of deficient care.
See, e.g., COMM. ON NURSING HOME REGULATION, INST. OF MED., IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF
CARE IN NURSING HOMES 70, 71 (1986) [hereinafter IOM REPORT].
7. See, e.g., id. at 1-2, 12-16, 238-53.
8. Thomas G. Morford, Nursing Home Regulation: History and Expectations, 1988
(SUPPL.) HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 129, 130 (1988) [hereinafter Morford].
9. IOM REPORT, supra note 6, at 69.
10. Id. at 69.
11. Id. at 76, 128, 131.
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valid, consistent, and reliable findings.”12 Further, according to IOM, failure to
base survey findings on review of a “statistically, valid case-mix-stratified
sample of residents” means that a nursing facility with very few residents at
high risk of problems and complications will incorrectly appear to have better
outcomes than a facility with a more debilitated population.13 OBRA ’87
adopted wholesale IOM’s recommendations.14
This article, beginning in the 1970s, reviews decades of studies of the
validity and accuracy of nursing home regulation. Using primarily studies and
reports prepared by, or at the behest of, the federal government, this article
demonstrates that every study of the system used by the federal government to
assess nursing home care has shown nursing home quality assessment is
inconsistent, inaccurate, and unreliable. Yet, government regulators, industry
officials, resident advocates, courts, and public policy researchers persist in
relying on survey data—and encourage others to do so as well—to pursue
enforcement actions, to draw conclusions about the relative and absolute
quality of nursing facilities, to make conclusions about the state of nursing
facility care generally, and to recommend public health policy initiatives
regarding nursing facility care delivery.
In the usual case, the ability of regulators and others to utilize data of
questionable validity would be subject to judicial review. As a general rule,
courts would not permit the use of data or opinion testimony without some
showing that the data and the opinions based on them are valid and reliable.15

12. Id. at 131.
13. Id. at 114, 115-17.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(2)(C) (2012). The meaning of “valid” is also well understood
outside of the context of OBRA ’87. There is a body of case law interpreting “valid” to mean
capable of producing accurate and reliable results. The Supreme Court, for example, has held that
district courts must, and such courts routinely do, determine the scientific validity of expert
testimony as a precondition to admitting such testimony into evidence. See, e.g., Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 (1993) (“We note that scientists typically
distinguish between “validity” (does the principle support what it purports to show?) and
“reliability” (does application of the principle produce consistent results?)”); see also Pride v.
BIC Corp., 218 F.3d 566, 577 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Proposed testimony must be supported by
appropriate validation - i.e., “good grounds,” based on what is known) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S.
at 590); see also Berry v. Crown Equip. Corp., 108 F. Supp. 2d 743, 749 (E.D. Mich. 2000)
(same); see also Thompson v. Frostproof, 103 So. 118, 118 (Fla. 1925) (“Validate, validation and
validating are all derivatives of valid, which is defined in the Century Dictionary as meaning to
test the validity of, to make valid, confirm, good or sufficient in point of law, efficacious,
executed with the proper formalities, incapable of being rightfully overthrown or set aside,
sustainable and effective in law as distinguished from that which exists or took place [sic] in fact
or appearance but has not the requisites to enable it to be recognized and enforced by law.”). By
using the term “validate,” Congress used a term that courts are familiar with and routinely apply
to determine whether evidence has sufficient indicia of accuracy and that it is reliable enough to
be relied on or considered in determining the rights of litigants.
15. See supra note 14.
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Nursing home regulation is not the usual case, however. A series of
jurisdictional, procedural, economic, and practical barriers insulate the survey
protocol from meaningful challenge and judicial oversight; OBRA ’87’s
commands to test and validate the survey protocol and to measure and reduce
inconsistency are thereby rendered largely meaningless.16

16. First, despite OBRA’87 requirement that routine annual (known as “standard”) surveys
must be conducted using the specified protocol, 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(2)(C); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395i-3(g)(3)(A) (requiring federal surveyors conducting validation surveys to assess the
performance of state surveyors to utilize the same protocol), the surveyors’ failure to utilize the
prescribed survey protocol is irrelevant when challenging survey decisions. See 42 C.F.R. §
488.305(b) (2014) (“The State survey agency’s failure to follow the procedures set forth in this
section will not invalidate otherwise legitimate determinations that a facility’s deficiencies
exist.”); see also 42 C.F.R. § 488.318(a)-(b) (2014) (“Inadequate survey performance,” including
the failure,” [u]se Federal standards, protocols and the forms to, methods and procedures
specified by CMS. . .” and the failure to “[c]onduct surveys in accordance with the requirements
of this subpart” does not “invalidate adequately documented deficiencies.”).
Federal court review is also not realistic. The Medicare Act denies federal courts
jurisdiction to review challenges to the survey and enforcement system until after complete
exhaustion of administrative remedies. Exhaustion of such remedies is costly and often takes a
year or more to complete, effectively rendering any remedy meaningless. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2012), made applicable to the Medicare Act by 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii (2012) and to appeals by
nursing facilities by 42 U.S.C. 1395cc(h)(1) (2012). See also Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long
Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 12-13 (2000); id. at 48 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Peak Med. Okla.
No. 5 d/b/a Woodland View Care & Rehab. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 2010 WL 4809319, at *4 (N.D.
Okla. Nov. 5, 2010).
Third, a nursing facility may appeal an adverse finding only when a “remedy,” i.e, a
sanction, is imposed by CMS. If the provider corrects the alleged problem in order to avoid
sanction and assure uninterrupted Medicare and Medicaid payments, the right to appeal is lost.
Thus, a provider wishing to appeal must maintain its innocence and accept substantial economic
risk to mount a challenge the protocol – a challenge that a court will not hear and adjudicate for
years. See e.g., Bryn Mawr Care Inc., v. Sebelius, 749 F.3d 592, 603 (7th Cir. 2014).
Finally, the procedural rules and rules of decision utilized in administrative appeals
effectively “stack the deck” in CMS’s favor. See generally Joseph L. Bianculli and Kelly A.
Priegnitz, Presentation at American Health Lawyers Association, Long Term Care and the Law
Conference: 2012 Survey and Enforcement Case Law Update (Feb. 2012), available at
https://www.healthlawyers.org/Events/Programs/Materials/Documents/LTC12/papers/N_biancull
i_priegnitz.pdf. Such rules make the chances of a nursing facility prevailing minimal and the
investment in doing so, at least, questionable. Id. at 3-4. (“During 2010 and 2011, the Board
issued about 50 decisions on the merits in nursing facility appeals (that is, not including decisions
on procedural issues such as timeliness and the like). During this two year period, the Board
decided exactly zero of these appeals in favor of facilities on the merits. In contrast to past years,
the Board did not reverse a single ALJ Decision against a facility. During this same time period,
ALJs rendered about 100 decisions on the merits. Of these, about five set aside all cited
deficiencies, and another half dozen set aside most deficiencies, and/or most of the sanctions
CMS imposed. CMS did not appeal every such decision, but in those that CMS did appeal to the
Board, the Board reversed (or remanded for reconsideration) every such favorable decision.
Contrast this track record to past years, where facilities routinely “won” about a quarter of all
cases decided on the merits.” (footnotes omitted) Moreover, even when a provider successfully
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Consequently, effective enforcement of IOM’s “prime directive” and
OBRA ’87’s mandate that nursing facility care be assessed using a
methodology that produces valid and accurate results is not possible as a
practical matter. The inability to challenge the validity and accuracy of the
survey protocol also means that government regulators are largely
unaccountable for failing to correct survey systems flaws.
There is, therefore, little incentive—and virtually no compulsion—for
regulators to assure that surveys produce valid, reliable, consistent, and
accurate findings of both compliance and noncompliance. To the contrary, by
continually focusing on under-citation, such individuals advance the politically
and professionally desirable goals of enhancing their image and that of the
enforcement agencies as regulators who are tough on noncompliance and
committed to ferreting out problems. Accurate policing has a limited and less
compelling constituency. Thus, declines in deficiency rates and severity are
dismissed—based on speculation and without empirical evidence—as
attributable to unknown factors and not indicative of care improvements.17
Relying on deeply flawed data—and encouraging others to do so—without
acknowledging the flaws is a betrayal of the public trust. Most importantly, it
deceives those whose health, safety, and welfare depends upon the credibility
and effectiveness of the nursing facility survey process. It also sends a message
to the regulated and to the first level regulators that the survey process is
“effective,” whether or not it is accurate, because it serves the narrow political
interests of regulators and others who rely on the data despite knowledge that
the survey is not an accurate or consistent performance measurement tool.
Finally, after almost thirty years, it has institutionalized a survey system that is
arbitrary, inconsistent, ineffective, and does not promote quality. That result, it
seems, is more palatable, administratively and politically, than admitting that
the survey process has never been tested and validated as OBRA ’87 required
and, consequently, that the government has no effective means of
distinguishing quality care from deficient care.
II. THE NURSING HOME SURVEY SYSTEM: HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
In order to be eligible for payment by the Medicare and Medicaid
programs, a nursing facility must be certified as in compliance with federal and

disputes a deficiency citation, the government cannot be compelled to correct its records or
precluded from public disclosures alleging that the facility violated care standards. See, e.g., Bryn
Mawr Care Inc., 749 F.3d at 603. Consequently, at least one level, victory is pyrrhic.
17. Compare Statement of Leslie v. Norwalk, Acting Admin. CMS, Taking Quality Nursing
Home Care to the Next Level (Apr. 19, 2007), available at https://www.nhqvalitycampaign.org/
files/NHQC0407_LOS_CMSnorwalk.pdf (discussing extensive, voluntary care improvement
programs instituted by nursing home industry).
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state quality standards.18 The federal quality standards are embodied in a
detailed set of substantive care standards contained in federal regulations.19
A nursing facility obtains certification that it is in compliance with federal
quality standards by submitting to an inspection, called a survey, performed by
state inspectors.20 These inspectors, known as “surveyors,” are generally the
same individuals who perform inspections to determine a nursing facility’s
compliance with state licensure laws.
The work of the state inspectors is subject to periodic oversight and review
by federal officials.21 Federal review and oversight may take a variety of forms
ranging from desk review of the state surveyors’ findings, on-site surveys by
federal inspectors shortly after the state inspection, “looking behind” the state
results and comparative federal surveys.22 Importantly, whether a survey is
conducted by state surveyors or by federal surveyors, the Medicare and
Medicaid Acts require that all surveys must be conducted using the same
quality assessment protocols and methodologies required pursuant to OBRA
’87.23
In the first twenty-five years after passage of the Medicaid Act, consensus
developed among all concerned that the initial quality standards governing
nursing facility care delivery and the enforcement of those standards did not
result in the quality of care expected.24 A number of reasons were given to
explain why the quality desired was not the quality delivered.
First, it was widely believed that the quality standards assessed the wrong
things. The initial substantive care standards in the regulations were primarily
structural; that is, the regulations primarily focused upon such things as the
organization of the nursing facility,25 the resources available,26 and
qualifications of the staff.27 The assumption implicit in those initial regulations
was that if the right resources were in place, good results and care outcomes
would follow because those responsible for care delivery would do the right
thing.28

18. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(3); 42 C.F.R. § 488.330 (2014).
19. 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.1-75 (2014).
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(1)(A); 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.10(a), 488.11(a), 488.12 (2014)
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(3)(A).
22. IOM REPORT, supra note 6, at 37-38.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(2)(C); 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(3)(A).
24. IOM REPORT, supra note 6, at 12-16, 238-248 (discussing the history of nursing home
regulation); see also Morford, supra note 8, at 131; Gary S. Winzelberg, The Quest for Nursing
Home Quality: Learning History’s Lessons, 163 ARCH. INT. MED. 2552, 2552 (2003); Patricia A
Butler, Assuring the Quality of Care in Nursing Homes, 57 N.C. L. REV. 1317, 1336-37 (1979).
25. IOM REPORT, supra note 6, at 53.
26. Id. at 296.
27. Id. at 76.
28. Id. at 54.
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Second, it also was widely believed that quality problems were the result,
at least in part, of weaknesses in the inspection process. For example, every
state had its own approach to conducting inspections.29 Some states allowed
individual surveyors to utilize ad hoc approaches; other states required a more
structured approach. Some states required assessment of a sample of nursing
facility residents; others required that the care of every resident be assessed by
the inspectors.
The federal government itself required two different surveys. One survey
was done for certification purposes to determine whether the facility was in
compliance with Medicare and/or Medicaid requirements, and, therefore,
eligible for payment for services rendered to beneficiaries of those programs.30
The second survey, known as the inspection of care (IOC) survey, was done to
determine whether a nursing facility’s Medicaid residents were receiving
adequate care.31 The IOC survey determined whether the state was entitled to
payment of federal matching funds for the care of each Medicaid resident.32
The two surveys were generally done in conjunction with one another but
using different quality assessment methods.33 The certification survey assessed
the care rendered to the facility’s residents generally, i.e., in the aggregate.
There was no requirement that each resident’s care be individually assessed.
The IOC survey was conducted independently of the certification survey, but
often by the same state surveyors who had conducted the certification survey.
IOC surveyors, however, were required to conduct an individualized
assessment of the condition, needs, and adequacy of the care provided based
on record review and observation of each Medicaid resident.34
In addition to not requiring that the certification survey be conducted using
a uniform methodology, the substantive care criteria applied to evaluate a
nursing facility were vague. Consequently, the surveyors also had broad
discretion to determine the meaning and application of the regulations in
individual circumstances. Such discretion, it was widely believed, introduced
an unacceptable level of subjectivity and inconsistency into the survey
process.35
Third, even when it was generally agreed that the process had identified
quality deficiencies, enforcement was inconsistent. Initially, termination of a
facility’s Medicare or Medicaid participation was the only remedy for quality

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 35.
IOM REPORT, supra note 6, at 69.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 319.
Id. at 140.
See, e.g., id. at 71.
IOM REPORT, supra note 6, at 108, 140-42 (describing IOC survey).
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deficiencies.36 Termination, however, was rarely used because: (1) the nursing
facility’s residents would bear the brunt of the sanction when they were
forcibly relocated; and (2) there were insufficient numbers of nursing facilities
to meet the demand for nursing facility services.37 In short, the passage of the
Medicare and Medicaid Act had created a benefit and guaranteed payment for
delivery of such services, but there were insufficient nursing home beds
available to satisfy the demand for services. This meant that regulators were
extremely reluctant to aggressively enforce quality standards because closure
of a nursing facility might leave its residents with nowhere to go.38 As a result,
surveyors were viewed as consultants whose job was to encourage and assist
delinquent nursing facilities to come into compliance with federal quality
standards.39
The impact of the systemic flaws in the regulatory system was confirmed
by, among others, a 1971 General Accounting Office (GAO) Report titled
“Problems in Providing Proper Care to Medicare and Medicaid Patients in
Skilled Nursing Homes.”40 The Report found “many nursing homes
participating in the Medicaid program—and in some cases, the Medicare
program—were not adhering to Federal requirements for participation.”41
According to GAO, “[t]he nonadherence to requirements resulted primarily
from weaknesses in State procedures for certifying eligibility of homes and
from ineffective State and HEW enforcement of Federal requirements.” 42
In the mid-1980s, the regulatory environment began to change
dramatically. The consultative approach was displaced in favor of a more
aggressive, enforcement-orientated approach. A number of factors contributed
to this change: (1) litigation challenging the effectiveness of the inspection
process and, specifically, whether that process actually assessed the quality of
care provided; (2) a series of notorious reports of inadequate and poor quality
care in long-term care facilities; (3) shifting in the care needs of the typical
long-term care resident from custodial care to more complex, professional, and
36. See id. at 13, 154.
37. Id. at 13.
38. Id. at 240-41. The problem was two-fold. First, sufficient numbers of facilities and beds
to meet demand did not exist or were not located appropriately to serve the population in need. In
addition those facilities that did exist, relatively few met the certification standards. In the first
year, after adoption of the Medicare program, 6,000 facilities applied for certification but only
740 qualified; another 3,000 facilities were certified as in substantial compliance. Id.
39. Id. at 150.
40. U.S. GOV’T GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, B-164031(3), PROBLEMS IN PROVIDING
PROPER CARE TO MEDICAID AND MEDICARE PATIENTS IN SKILLED NURSING HOMES 2 (May 28,
1971).
41. Id. at 2.
42. Id. at 9. This GAO report found that more than one-half of the nursing facilities audited
in three states were in violation of federal certification standards pertaining to nurse staffing,
physician visits and fire safety. Id. at 2-3.
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post-acute care; (4) sharply escalating federal and state payments for long-term
care coupled with uncertainty regarding whether such payments actually
supported quality of care; and, (5) the maturing of the nursing facility industry
such that sufficient beds generally were available to meet the demand for
nursing facility services.
In Colorado, for example, a group of nursing facility residents sued both
the federal and state governments claiming that the inspection methodology
used to determine compliance with substantive care standards was
ineffective.43 The plaintiffs contended that the survey tools inappropriately
assessed only a facility’s capability of delivering care, not actual patient
outcomes or the effectiveness of such care. As a result, the plaintiffs argued,
the government had no idea whether Medicaid payments to long-term care
facilities were buying quality care.
In 1984, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed.
The court held:
The Secretary has a duty to promulgate regulations which will enable her to be
informed as to whether the nursing facilities receiving federal Medicaid funds
are actually providing high quality medical care . . . . [T]he Secretary has failed
44
to discharge her statutory duty altogether.

On remand, the District Court ordered the Secretary of HHS45 to develop a
survey protocol that was prescriptive, that was embodied in regulations and
that assessed quality based on actual resident outcome, rather than based on
whether a facility’s care process and structure indicated that it was capable of
delivering quality of care.46
At about the same time, after several failed attempts to revise the survey,
certification, and enforcement processes administratively,47 Congress ordered
HHS to contract with the IOM to study the existing regulatory system and to
make recommendations for improvements. In 1986, the IOM returned its
landmark report, “Improving the Quality of Care in Nursing Homes.”48
After discussing the current state of nursing facility regulation, the IOM
made a fundamental point:

43. Estate of Smith v. Heckler, 747 F.2d. 583, 585 (10th Cir. 1984).
44. Id. at 591.
45. At the time the agency was known as the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW). Similarly, at the same time, the component of HEW responsible for administration of the
survey process was the Health Care Financing Administration. The name changes have no
practical significance for present purposes. Therefore, throughout this article the entities’ current
names are used – the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).
46. Id. at 591-92.
47. IOM REPORT, supra note 6, at 1.
48. See generally id.
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Government regulation of nursing homes for quality assurance purposes has
three components: (1) the criteria used to determine whether a nursing home is
providing care of acceptable quality . . . (2) the procedures used to determine
the extent to which nursing homes comply with the criteria, and (3) the
procedures used to enforce compliance. The three components are the like the
49
legs of a three-legged stool: All are equally important.

IOM emphasized that the “development and use of valid and reliable
instruments to measure quality are critically important to quality assurance and
to regulation.”50 According to IOM, the survey protocol should be validated by
“[t]he findings of careful empirical studies,” and the survey protocol should be
“carefully analyzed for interrater reliability in the use of the instrument [].”
Such testing was necessary because “[s]urvey findings must be valid and
reliable as well as consistent . . . .”51 “[S]tatistically defensible . . . procedures,”
IOM reiterated, were “essential . . . to achieve valid,52 consistent and reliable
findings.” According to IOM, this meant that “[a]ll survey protocols
(instruments and procedures) should be tested so that when used by properly
trained surveyors they produce consistent and reliable findings.”53
In 1987, Congress adopted virtually all of IOM’s recommendations,
essentially without modification, in OBRA ’87.54 Among the many significant
and far-reaching changes made by OBRA ’87, three are important here.
First, the statute shifted the focus of the inspection process away from its
prior concern with process and structural requirements. Rather than asking
whether a facility was organized in a way that made the facility capable of
providing quality of care, OBRA ’87 required that quality be determined by
focusing primarily on the actual outcomes of resident care.55 In short,
following OBRA ’87, surveyors were no longer to assess what a long-term
care facility could do; surveyors were to determine whether the facility
residents actually received care to meet their needs based on whether those
residents achieved or maintained appropriate care outcomes.56
Second, the statute contemplated that regulators would aggressively
enforce compliance with quality standards. To that end, OBRA ’87 provided
enforcement tools, including a variety of intermediate sanctions, including
Civil Money Penalties, temporary management, and denial of payment in

49. Id. at 69.
50. Id. at 56.
51. Id. at 128.
52. Id.
53. IOM REPORT, supra note 6, at 128.
54. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-1339 (Dec.
22, 1987).
55. See, e.g., Morford, supra note 8, at 131 (“The basic change overriding all others is . . .
emphasis on patient outcomes”).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(b)(2) (2012).
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certain circumstances, short of termination of a nursing facility’s participation
in Medicare and Medicaid programs.57
The new enforcement process was intended to limit the time between
discovery of a violation of care standards and imposition of a remedy as a
means of encouraging compliance. Moreover, the menu of intermediate
sanctions, i.e., other than termination of program participation, was intended to
punish the facility without directly burdening the residents as had previously
been the case when program termination was the only option for
noncompliance. As a result, it was expected that remedies would be utilized
without hesitation.
Finally, OBRA ’87 also included an express requirement that the survey
protocol utilized to assess the quality of nursing facility care be tested and
validated prior to the date the statute required that the new approach be
implemented, January 1, 1990.58 Further, the federal Secretary and the states
were mandated to implement ongoing programs to assure that survey results
were consistent.59 The statute provided:
(C) SURVEY PROTOCOL. Standard and extended surveys shall be
conducted —
(i) based upon a protocol which the Secretary has developed, tested and
validated by not later than January 1, 1990, and . . .
(D) CONSISTENCY OF SURVEYS. Each State and the Secretary shall
implement programs to measure and reduce inconsistency in the application of
60
survey results among surveyors.

The statute also provided that the failure to develop, test, and validate the
survey protocol did not relieve a state or the Secretary of the responsibility to
survey nursing facilities.61 Although nursing facility surveys would continue to
be conducted primarily by state inspectors, the statute required oversight by the
Secretary. Among other things, the statute required that federal surveyors
conduct follow-up, or validation surveys, shortly after the state inspections in
order to determine if the state survey results were accurate and valid.62 The
survey methodology utilized to assess nursing facility quality was considered
sufficiently important that Congress required the federal oversight surveys to
be conducted using the same, “tested and validated” methodology that the state
surveyors were required to utilize. Specifically, OBRA ’87 provided:

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(h)(1)-(2).
42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(2)(C).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(2)(D).
42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(2)(C)(i)-(D).
42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(2)(C).
42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(3)(A).
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(3) Validation Surveys.
(A) The Secretary shall conduct onsite surveys of a representative sample
of skilled nursing facilities in each State . . . . In conducting such surveys,
the Secretary shall use the same survey protocols as the state is required to
63
use . . . .

The statute requires that the Secretary conduct such surveys in a minimum of
five percent, but not less than five, nursing facilities in each state.64
III. THE MANDATE TO “TEST AND VALIDATE:” THIRTY YEARS OF
GOVERNMENT STUDIES OF THE ACCURACY, VALIDITY, AND CONSISTENCY OF
SURVEY RESULTS
The Secretary failed to adhere to the OBRA ’87 mandate with respect to
the development and implementation of the new survey protocol almost from
the beginning. Although OBRA ’87 required that the survey protocol be tested
and validated “not later than January 1, 1990,” i.e., before the new rules were
effective,65 the Secretary did not contract to test the survey protocol until
September 1991, nine months after the testing and validation was supposed to
have been completed.66 Moreover, the contract provided that the testing of the
survey protocol would not be completed for two years thereafter or, stated
differently, the testing would not be completed for three years after the
statutory deadline.67
In fact, however, the testing was not completed within the expected two
years after the contract was let. Instead, in 1993, only the preliminary results

63. Id.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(3)(B).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(2)(C).
66. ABT ASSOCIATES, INC., EVALUATION OF THE LONG TERM CARE SURVEY PROCESS,
FINAL REPORT at i (1996) (hereinafter FINAL REPORT).
67. In 2002 the United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that the
Secretary had no obligation to validate the survey protocol prior to January 1, 1990. Instead, the
court held that the statute “implie[d] an ongoing process that will result in changes and
refinements.” To be sure, OBRA’87 mandates an on-going process to assure that survey results
are accurate and consistent. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(2)(D). That requirement, however, is
distinct from the mandate to “test and validate” the survey protocol prior to the January 1, 1990
implementation date. The Court also ignores that Congress, by requiring validation of the
protocol by a specific date and prior to implementation did not contemplate an open-ended neverending process that continues to this day. IOM’s recommendation and OBRA’87 were intended
to eliminate the validity, reliability and consistency problems that previously characterized survey
findings. OBRA’87 required a result, not a process.
In the interest of full disclosure, the author of this article was counsel to the plaintiff in
Beverly Health and Rehabilitative Services, Inc. v. Thompson, 223 F.Supp.2d 73 (D.D.C. 2002).
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were available.68 Those preliminary results found that the protocol did not
produce valid results:
Despite implementation of the minimum data system (MDS) [tool for
assessing nursing home residents’ needs] and attempts to train surveyors in
how to evaluate outcomes through the interpretive guidelines, the current
69
survey does not lead to valid assessments of outcome.

In short, the preliminary results found that the new survey protocol failed to
satisfy one of the basic requirements of OBRA ’87, that the survey protocol
produce valid results.
In 1996—six years after the statutory deadline for testing and validating
the survey protocol—the Final Report largely came to the same conclusions.
Among other things, the Final Report concluded “that the exercise of surveyor
discretion can lead to harmful facility practices not being cited, or practices
being inappropriately cited, in both quality of care and quality of life
domains.”70 Further, the Abt Report concluded, “the structure of the survey,
the instruments employed, the training of surveyors, and the inclinations of
many surveyors, do not readily result in the resident-centered, outcomeoriented process that the IOM envisioned.”71 According to the Final Report,
“[t]o make judgments about outcomes, surveyors must rely heavily on their
professional training and experience and on the brief training provided to them
about the survey process.72 Abt also found that:
For all the emphasis that surveyors place on ‘nursing knowledge,’ that
knowledge in itself does not provide an adequate basis for many nurse73
surveyors to properly make decisions about outcomes.

As a result, Abt found that deficiency citations were often inaccurate both
because actual problems were not cited and because citations were issued when
not warranted.
More specifically, Abt studied in depth nine key outcomes corresponding
to the most prevalent quality issues in nursing facilities. The Final Report
found false negative citations (i.e., under-citation) of quality problems in all of
the domains from thirty-nine to seventy-eight percent of the time and found
false positive citations (i.e., over-citation) in five of the domains from sixteen
to twenty-eight percent of the time. 74 For example, Abt concluded that twenty-

68. See generally ABT ASSOCS., INC., BRIEFING POINTS ON THE PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
RESULTS, EVALUATION OF THE NURSING HOME CERTIFICATION PROCESS (1993) [hereinafter
BRIEFING POINTS].
69. Id. at 3.
70. FINAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 1.
71. Id. at 1-2.
72. Id. at 72.
73. Id. at 96.
74. Id.
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three percent of citations for failure to improve function and twenty-eight
percent of citations for pressure sore prevention and treatment were false
positives.75 On the other hand,76 surveyors did not cite care problems related to
failures to improve function in seventy-eight percent of the cases and in sixty
percent of the cases with respect to failure to maintain acceptable nutrition
parameters.77 Overall, the percentage of false negative citations ranged from
thirty-nine percent to seventy-eight percent (average: sixty-one percent). The
percentage of false positive citations ranged from twenty-eight percent to five
percent (average: fifteen percent). Thus, in the aggregate, Abt found that, for
nine care domains studied, survey findings, on average, were inaccurate
seventy-six percent of the time.
The problem, however, was not just that the survey findings were
inaccurate. In addition, the Abt Final Report also found that survey findings
and enforcement were not consistent. Abt reported “considerable” fluctuation
in the rate at which deficiencies are cited and in the level and type of
enforcement actions from region to region and state to state.78 For example, in
CMS’ Region 9, an average of 13.09 deficiencies were cited per facility,
whereas in Region 2, an average of 4.76 deficiencies were cited.79 Abt found
that it was “difficult for individuals to exercise professional judgment
consistently” due to the lack of instructions for selecting resident samples and

75. FINAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 96.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 104. These survey findings examined in detail “correspond to many of the most
prevalent quality of care issues in nuring homes and to [the areas] frequently emphasized in
quality of care research[.]” Id. at 104. The false negative and false positive citation rates for each
area are as follows.
False
False
Area
Negative
Positive
Maintenance of Function

56%

16%

Personal Care

50%

9%

Improvement of Function

78%

23%

Incontinent Care

39%

6%

Pressure Sore Prevention
and Treatment

64%

28%

Restraint Usage

56%

16%

Maintenance of Appropriate
Nutritional Status

60%

20%

Neuroleptic Usage

67%

5%

Benzodiazepine Usage

75%

8%

Id. at 123.
78. Id. at 29, 33-34.
79. Id. at 31.
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making determinations such as what constitutes a deficiency and whether a
particular outcome was avoidable.80
Over the course of the next several years, the conclusions of the Final
Report were corroborated by other government-sponsored studies. For
example, in 1998, a congressionally mandated study81 conducted jointly by
CMS82 and Abt Associates found:
[T]he new enforcement regulation does not appear to be working as intended
. . . .[T]here is considerable variation among States in the degree of
enforcement, as measured by rates of deficiency or substandard quality of care
determination, [but] it is difficult to separate what proportion of the variation is
due to true differences in nursing home quality and what proportion is
83
attributable to differences in surveyor behavior.

It bears emphasis: The evidence supporting the conclusion that the survey
protocol was ‘not working’ consisted exclusively of data that fewer, and less
serious, deficiencies were being cited and that substantial variation existed in
citation rates in different states.
CMS’s method of testing the validity of the survey process marks a
significant and unexplained departure from the analysis previously used to
determine the validity and reliability of survey results. The original Abt
assessment of the survey protocol—consistent with CMS’s regulations—
assessed the survey’s validity based on: (1) whether the survey cited those
problems which actually existed; and (2) whether no citations were issued
when no requirement had been violated.84 The 1998 Report, however, does not

80. FINAL REPORT, supra note 66, at ii, 45, 56, 67, 72.
81. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-134, §
516(d), 110 Stat. 1321-248 (1996).
82. HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN. & ABT ASSOCS., INC., REPORT TO CONGRESS: STUDY OF
PRIVATE ACCREDITATION (DEEMING) OF NURSING HOMES, REGULATORY INCENTIVES AND
NON-REGULATORY INITIATIVES, AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SURVEY AND CERTIFICATION
SYSTEM 1 (1998) [hereinafter CMS REPORT]. The portion of the Report addressing the
effectiveness of the survey process was written by the Health Care Financing Administration, as
CMS formerly was known, not by the outside contractor, Abt Associates Inc. As a convenience,
the text refers to CMS as the author. This portion of the Report appears to rest primarily on
analysis of others’ research, and on data analysis rather than original field work.
83. Id. at 40.
84. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 122. CMS regulations specify a similar definition
that tested the accuracy of survey results based on whether (1) appropriate deficiencies were
cited; and (2) inappropriate citations were not issued. See, e.g., Medicare & Medicaid Programs;
Survey, Certification and Enforcement of Skilled Nursing Facilities and Nursing Facilities, 59
Fed. Reg. 56,146-47 (Nov. 10, 1994).
Likewise, the original assessment of the validity of the OBRA survey emphasized that
the integrity of the regulatory system would be undermined by both under and over citation:
In an effort to ensure standardization, HCFA devised a series of interpretive guidelines
and accompanying probes for surveyors to use in applying Federal standards. The
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analyze the results of the survey system from those two perspectives.
CMS asks only whether sufficient citations—as defined by
expectations—have been issued.
Because the number and severity of citations fell short of
expectations, the survey results were deemed invalid.85 There

105

Rather,
agency
CMS’s
is no

interpretive guidelines are designed to provide the surveyors with a uniform set of
indicators against which they can measure facility performance. The intent is to ensure
consistent application of the regulatory requirements by surveyors across the country and
to minimize, as much as possible, the influence of any individual’s subjective judgment. If
different surveyor teams were to introduce different criteria or thresholds to the survey
process, the reliability of that process would be threatened. If a survey team were to write
fewer – or more – negative findings and deficiencies as a result of its divergence from the
mandated process, that too would undermine the regulatory system. Hence, assessing the
consistency with which surveyors employ the survey process and the interpretive
guidelines is an important objective of the current evaluation.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 42.
85. For example, the 1998 Report noted the agency’s prediction that definitional changes
made in 1995 would result in “a substantial increase in deficiencies.” CMS REPORT, supra note
81, at 39-41. In fact, however, the mean number of citations per facility had continued to drop
steadily. Id. at 538. For example, in surveys where at least one deficiency was cited, the mean
number of deficiencies cited in 1994 was 8.3, but by 1997 the mean number had dropped to 6.2.
Id. In addition, the number of surveys in which no deficiencies were cited increased sixty-nine
percent between 1994 and1997. Id. at 538.
CMS’s 1998 Report identifies allegedly inaccurate citation rates in specific areas. For
example, the Report alleges that surveyors do not accurately identify nutrition problems, an area
which Abt also found problematic, but with respect to both over-citation (20 percent) and undercitation (60 percent). See FINAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 123; CMS REPORT, supra note 82, at
46. The Report notes that citations for certain federal requirements regarding nutrition had
declined from fifteen percent in 1991 to less than five percent in 1996. CMS REPORT, supra note
82, at 565. The Report dismisses the possibility that the declining citation rates reflects improving
care, concluding that the survey and certification results are not valid. Id. at 46, 565.
CMS’s Report also concludes that the survey protocol does not accurately identify abuse
of nursing home residents. Id. at 556. Once again, the Report identifies a decline in the rate of
citations for abuse, but asserts that the survey results are not valid indicators of improving quality,
stating that there is no independent evidence that the problem in fact has diminished. Id. at 578.
CMS’s Report also identified “considerable variation among States,” as measured by
rates of deficiency citations, by the range (0 to 14 percent) of substandard quality of care
determinations, by the pattern of immediate jeopardy findings and by the disparate range with
which the states issued citations at levels that might trigger sanctions (from 22 to 100 percent of
facilities in a given state). Id. at 541-543. The study also pointed out that, in 1998, five states
cited no substandard quality care and another ten states cited virtually no substandard quality
care. Id. at 42, 542. Again asserting that the citation patterns were not accurate. CMS stated that
the results could not be ascribed “to true differences in nursing home quality” and characterized
the “low rate” of substandard care citations as “implausible.” Id. at xi, 39-43.
CMS’s Report further asserts that “it is unclear, perhaps doubtful, that the degree of
quality improvement observed” could have been responsible for the downward deficiency trend.
Id. at 41, 540. Essentially, CMS concedes that they have no evidence explaining the results, that
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consideration of the possibility that systemic problems with the survey also
resulted in inappropriate false positive citations. Every subsequent government
sponsored study of the survey protocol would utilize a similar approach,
testing the validity of the system based on the incidence of false negative
citations.86
Nevertheless, despite focusing exclusively on whether the survey failed to
identify care delivery problems, this study confirmed that the survey results—
both problem identification and classification of severity—were inaccurate and
inconsistent.87 This conclusion was largely founded on three assumptions: (1)
that the new survey should have produced more citations;88 (2) that, although
nursing home quality had improved, the quality improvements did not explain
the observed decrease in citation rates and severity;89 and, (3) that deficiency
citations and classification made in simultaneous surveys conducted by CMS’
contract consultants—notably, using a different, specially designed protocol,
not the protocol used by the state surveyors who conducted the certification
survey—were the “gold standard” of accurate problem identification and
classification.90 It bears emphasis that the study provides no empirical support
for any of those assumptions.
One year later, and almost ten years after the date on which the statute
required the survey protocol be validated, the Office of Inspector General
(OIG) of HHS reported:
While it has now been more than a decade later since this legislation [OBRA
’87] was passed, there has been… no methodical evaluation of whether the
reforms it intended are actually working . . . .[T]he lack of a systematic review
makes it difficult to determine if this major legislation has been successful in
91
improving nursing home care.

Thus, OIG acknowledged, ten years after implementation, that OBRA ’87’s
quality assessment and enforcement system had never been validated. Stated
differently, fifteen years after the Tenth Circuit held in the Smith litigation that
the Secretary had failed to fulfill her clear “duty to promulgate regulations
which will enable her to be informed as to whether the nursing facilities

the reasons for the improving survey results are not known, but that the results cannot be
accurate. Id. at 538.
86. See infra pp. 23-26.
87. CMS REPORT, supra note 82, at x-xii, 39, 46, 538-40, 542, 549-54, 565-79.
88. Id. at x, 40, 41, 538-40.
89. Id. at 31, 46, 539-40, 565, 578.
90. Compare id. at 20, 43, with 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(3)(A) (2012) (requiring federal
surveyors assessing the validity of state survey results to utilize “the same survey protocols as the
State is required to use.”).
91. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI-02-9900060, QUALITY OF CARE IN NURSING HOMES: AN OVERVIEW 4 (1999) [hereinafter OIG OEI02-99-00060].
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receiving federal Medicaid funds are actually providing high quality medical
care.”92 The Secretary still had no basis to say whether the quality care for
which the government was paying was, or was not, being delivered.
The following year, the head of GAO’s health care unit testified before the
Senate Special Committee on Aging regarding the effectiveness of the survey
process.93 A colloquy between the committee chairman and GAO’s Dr.
William Scanlon confirmed, yet again, that the quality assessments made using
the survey protocol were not valid:
The Chairman. Dr. Scanlon, do you think the quality of the surveys and the
information in the OSCAR data base [in which nation-wide survey results are
recorded] is reliable enough to make judgments about the level of quality
provided in the nation’s nursing homes?
Dr. Scanlon. Mr. Chairman, I am afraid it is not. I think that the variation that
we see across states is troubling in the sense that we do not have confidence
that the surveys are being administered consistently . . . . We have no
confidence that this variation reflects the actual care that is being provided in
homes across states.
The Chairman. Do you think that the tools [CMS] and the states are using to
assess nursing homes give us information about the quality of care provided in
them and what do they tell us about the care provided?
Dr. Scanlon. Mr. Chairman, I do agree with the industry that we are not
94
measuring outcomes of care in the process of the survey . . . .

Thus, echoing what had been said in the original evaluation of the survey
performed by Abt several years earlier, GAO concluded that survey results
were not consistently applied, valid indicators of the quality of care actually
provided. Moreover, GAO also concluded that the survey was not measuring
the outcomes of resident care—the overarching goal, of OBRA ’87.95 To put it
bluntly, not only were the survey results not valid, whatever the survey was
assessing, it was not the performance measurement mandated by the OBRA
’87.96

92. Estate of Smith v. Heckler, 747 F.2d. 583, 591 (10th Cir. 1984).
93. The Nursing Home Initiative: Two-Year Progress Report Hearing Before the Spec.
Comm. on Aging, of the S. 106th Cong. III, 1 (2000) [hereinafter Scanlon Hearing].
94. Id. at 165-66.
95. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 442.30(a)(5)(ii) (2014) (“The survey process uses resident
outcomes as the primary means to establish the compliance status of facilities.”); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-794T, NURSING HOME REFORM: CONTINUED ATTENTION IS
NEEDED TO IMPROVE QUALITY OF CARE IN SMALL BUT SIGNIFICANT SHARES OF HOMES:
HEARING BEFORE THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING OF THE SENATE 1 (2007).
96. See Scanlon Hearing, supra note 93, at 166 (contrasting with what seemed to be CMS’s
belief, Dr. Scanlon stated that GAO has “never indicated . . . that a majority or even somewhat
more than a minority of homes is [sic] providing poor care”).
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The frankness of GAO’s testimony may have been surprising, but the
content should have sounded familiar. In addition to the findings made in the
Abt Preliminary and Final Reports, the same points had been made repeatedly
by those commenting on CMS’ proposed regulations containing the survey’s
enforcement protocols.
For example, during the rule-making process, a third-party study of the
validity and effectiveness of the survey process was submitted to CMS. The
study had been conducted by Jean Johnson-Pawlson, Ph.D., a highly regarded
nurse clinician, nursing school professor, and consultant to the IOM. That
study concluded that survey results were inaccurate, inconsistent, and not
based on resident outcomes.97
The Johnson-Pawlson study evaluated “the accuracy and consistency of
surveyor performance during standard nursing home surveys” based on
analysis of official deficiency reports from 420 nursing homes in twenty-one
states.98 The Johnson-Pawlson Study found that:
 45% of citations were not related to an actual or potential negative resident
outcome[;]
 42% of citations did not consider the seriousness of findings[;]
 35% of citations did not consider how widespread (scope) the surveyor
findings were in the facility[;]
 36% of the citations lacked sufficient documentation to support the
deficiency[; and]
 26% of deficiencies cited were not supported by information detailed in the
99
Long Term Care Survey Guidelines.

The data also indicated “considerable variation between states” and concluded
that “the probability of these differences being due to chance is zero.”100 The
Johnson-Pawlson Study concluded that to assess and enforce quality standards
using CMS’s on defendants’ survey process was “a major flaw:”
The magnitude of the potential inaccuracies is greater than what should be
acceptable to consumers, providers and regulatory agencies. With 30% of
citations potentially not meeting reasonable standards for determination of
deficiencies, the current survey process may not be a valid measure of the
101
extent to which facilities comply with federal requirements.

97. Rulemaking Record for Survey, Certification, and Enforcement of Skilled Nursing
Facilities and Nursing Facilities, 59 Fed. Reg. 56,116 (Nov. 10, 1994) at 5960, 5967 [hereinafter
Rulemaking Record].
98. Id.
99. Id. at 5960. See also Jean Johnson-Pawlson, Survey Inconsistencies Point To Need For
Better Training, PROVIDER 60 (Jan 1993).
100. Rulemaking Record, supra note 97, at 5967-68.
101. Id. at 5970.
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The reliability of the Johnson-Pawlson study was not questioned; instead, the
OIG would soon rely on the study as the basis for its own critique of the survey
methodology.
Other national and state organizations also, conducted their own studies,
reaching similar—and corroborating—results. The North Dakota Long-Term
Care Association submitted “a statewide, six month independent study
[concluding] that the current survey system is flawed.”102 The study was
performed by former manager of the North Dakota Health Facility Survey
Agency.103 The study evaluated deficiency citations for forty-three in-state
nursing facilities.104 Among the study findings were the following:





Deficiency not Based on Negative outcomes
Survey Procedures not Followed
Deficiency Not Supported by Regulation
Incorrect Regulation or Tag cited

77/226
57/226
42/226
21/226

34%
25%
19%
105
9%

The Association’s report also concluded that “[t]he study indicated there is
inconsistent application of federal laws by surveyors.”106
A study conducted by the Kentucky Association of Health Care Facilities
covered the twelve-month period from October 1990 through September
1991.107 The study concluded:
152 of 346 deficiencies [were] inappropriately cited under the OBRA survey
process . . . . The summary found that deficiency content was incomplete and
did not address the regulation. This problem was consistent throughout the
review. Deficiencies which were found to be incomplete did not reflect that the
steps as outlined in the training manuals etc., were followed in order to gather
108
information prior to deficiency formulation.

Those findings corroborated what had been said previously and should have
been surprising to no one.
Although the problem of inconsistency between states was well known, the
Kentucky study also identified problematic inconsistency in deficiency
citations within the state as well as among nearby states.109 Tracking the
deficiencies cited by the state surveyors revealed “no pattern of what type
deficiencies are cited per region” among the four regions in the state.110 The
Association noted that “[e]ach office seems to vary not only in which area of

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 020134-48, 020134.
Id. at 020134.
Id. at 020141.
Rulemaking Record, supra note 97, at 020135.
Id.
Id. at 4110-13.
Id. at 4111.
Id. at 4111-12.
Rulemaking Record, supra note 97, at 4111.
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the regulations the problem lies, but in the number of deficiencies being cited
per region.”111 Moreover, “[i]n reviewing the deficiency profiles complied by
[CMS’s], Region IV, there is much discrepancy among the eight [nearby]
states, as to the [seriousness of] . . . deficiencies and the area of
concentration.”112
An analysis of survey results by the Georgia Nursing Home Association
identified “about a 30% error rate.”113 Further,
[t]he inconsistency in our State and the HCFA Region show a variance
between states ranging from 4% to 54% for the same tag number. OSCAR
reports [a computerized CMS database compiling survey results] show
Georgia leading the nation in some program requirements and neighboring
states near the bottom. Georgia also leads the nation in [the percentage of
facilities cited at the most serious level of] deficiencies with 14% of the
114
facilities receiving [such] citations while the national average is 6%.

Data submitted by the Louisiana Nursing Home Association likewise
found intra-state variation in citations. For example, one regulatory violation
was cited fourteen times in one of the seven regions in the state, whereas
another region cited the same violation only once.115
Whatever discount might arguably be necessary for comments offered by
provider representatives, should have been offset because the concerns were
corroborated by government officials directly responsible for the survey and
certification program. For example, one of CMS’s Regional Offices was
critical of the inconsistency of survey results in the same time frame.
We have found the new long term survey protocols and guidelines do not
provide a method for producing consistent survey decisions. Therefore, a State
agency that cites more deficiencies will have more facilities facing alternate
remedies than states who historically cite fewer deficiencies. [The agency’s]
OSCAR report #19 [recording all deficiency citations] gives evidence of this
by showing the number of deficiencies cited that are above or below two
116
standard deviations of the national mean.

Echoing what Abt had said years earlier, the Regional Office continues,
explaining that:
CMS had not determined a precise definition of individual data tags in LTC
regulations. In other words, when a LTC survey team collects evidence and
determines there is a deficiency, it is not clear which data tag should be cited.

111. Id.
112. Id. at 4112.
113. Id. at 6825.
114. Id.
115. Rulemaking Record, supra note 97, at 009174.
116. Id. at 032815 (Letter from the Associate Regional Administrator, Division of Health
Standards and Quality, HCFA, Region X).
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There are in fact, multiple, correct, data tags that can be cited for the same
deficiency. The danger in this situation is obviously lack of surveyor
consistency on a national scale. The application of sanctions will be
117
inconsistent.

That the criticisms were made in writing by an Associate Regional
Administrator of Division of Health Standards and Quality—the division of
CMS responsible for day-to-day oversight of the survey—should have been
unsettling. Individual states also objected that CMS did not have “consistently
applied and meaningful standards.”118 Inconsistency, according to another
state, was inevitable because “HCFA does not have a defined threshold for
deficiencies and admits that deficiencies are based on surveyor judgment.”119
States also criticized the proposed rule for ignoring resident outcomes.120 The
State Medicaid Directors’ Association criticized the proposed rule for not
“focus[ing] on resident outcomes.”121
In May 1993, the OIG issued a report “State Progress in Carrying Out the
Nursing Home Survey Reforms.”122 The OIG Report found that the nineteen
states it had studied “are facing implementation problems that could jeopardize
the intent of the nursing home reforms.”123 Relying on the Johnson-Pawlson
Study, OIG warned:
That study raises questions about the extent to which surveyors . . . have
adjusted to the new outcome focus: 45 percent of the deficiency statements
failed to consider either actual or potential negative outcomes. When these
deficiencies related more to a home’s structure than to a resident’s outcome
were excluded, 43 percent still failed to consider actual or potential
124
outcome.

OIG’s fear that the intent of the nursing home reforms was in jeopardy would
be confirmed within two months by “a report for which defendants contracted
117. Id. at 032817.
118. Id. at 032080 (citing Letter from Ga. Dep’t. of Human Resources).
119. Id. at 012159 (citing Letter from State of Me. Dep’t. of Human Services); see also id. at
032082-83 (citing Letter from Ga. Dep’t. of Human Resources criticizing the enforcement
regulations for “not giv[ing] notice of proscribed conduct” to the extent “that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application”).
120. Id. at 013809 (citing Letter from Ark. Dep’t. of Human Services).
121. Id. at 013389.
122. Transcript of Administrative Record at 14685, Beverly Health and Rehabilitation-Spring
Hill v. Health Care Fin. Admin., Dec. No. CR553 (Department Appeals Board, Civil Remedies
Div. 1998), aff’d Dec. No. 1696 (Department Appeals Board, App. Div. 1999) [hereinafter
Administrative Record].
123. Id. at 14686; OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG OEI 01-91-01580, STATE PROGRESS IN
CARRYING OUT THE NURSING HOME SURVEY REFORMS at ii (1993) [hereinafter OIG OEI 01-9101580].
124. Administrative Record, supra note 122, at 14689; OIG OEI 01-91-01580, supra note
123, at 4.
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on surveyor decision making and consistency as well as quality of care and
quality of life measurement.”125
Many of the problems identified by GAO, OIG and the commentary on the
proposed enforcement rule also were largely confirmed by IOM in a 2001
follow-up to the 1986 report that had been the foundation for OBRA ’87’s
survey and enforcement legislation.126 The 2001 IOM report found that:
Several studies support the conclusion that the current survey process fails
to identify important quality of care problems . . . .
[States] very substantially in their survey findings and no evidence
suggests that this variation is a function of corresponding variation in the
127
quality of care provided in the states.

In other words, whether the care provided by a nursing facility was found
acceptable or unacceptable depended on where it was located, not on the actual
quality of the care delivered.
One year later, in 2002, CMS sought proposals to redesign the survey
methodology. According to the Request for Proposals (RFP), CMS sought to
redesign the survey process because:
There is substantial State variation in nursing home deficiency rates, and scope
and severity determinations for identified deficiencies. . . . Some of these
differences might be accounted for by real quality differences among the
nursing homes, but it is extremely unlikely that average differences in this
great of magnitude for entire states can be explained in any significant degree
by real quality of care differences. . . . [N]or can possible state differences in
morbidity of nursing home populations’ account for these differences in
128
citation patterns.

Further, according to CMS, “[t]he State-to-State variability in magnitude and
pattern of various kinds of deficiency citation rates indicate that there is
inconsistency in the survey process and raises doubts about the appropriateness
in some deficiencies of either over or under identification of problems.”129
Despite acknowledging that: (1) it was “extremely unlikely” that survey
results reflected “real quality of care;” and (2) doubts about “the

125. Administrative Record, supra note 122, at 14684; OIG OEI 01-91-01580, supra note
123, at 10. OIG appears to be referring to the Abt Associates’ preliminary reports discussed
previously, which were presented to HCFA in July, 1993. Administrative Record, supra note 122,
at 14303-14312; BRIEFING POINTS, supra note 68, at 1-9.
126. DIV. OF HEALTH CARE SERVS., INST. OF MED., IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LONGTERM CARE 77-79, (Gooloo S. Wunderlich and Peter O. Kohler, eds., 2001).
127. Id. at 145, 151.
128. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL, No. CMS-02017/JB, IMPROVING THE CONSISTENCY OF THE NURSING HOME SURVEY PROCESS 3-4 (2002)
[hereinafter IMPROVING THE CONSISTENCY].
129. Id. at 4, 10.
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appropriateness,” i.e., accuracy of problem identification,130 CMS continued to
utilize the survey results to determine facilities’ compliance with Medicare and
Medicaid requirements and as a basis for imposing sanctions on facilities with
no accommodation for the admitted concerns about the validity and accuracy
of survey results.131 To the contrary, rather than acknowledge the potential
impact on individual providers, CMS, as a practical matter, had insulated its
failure to validate the survey protocol from challenge. CMS’ regulations
prohibited facilities from challenging survey results or enforcement actions in
appeals before Administrative Law Judges based on defects in the survey
protocol from oversight.132
It is fair to ask what the consequences might be for a private litigant who
offered or relied on evidence acquired in violation of a statute or regulation or
on evidence developed using non-standard protocols and methodologies.133 It

130. Id. at 3, 9.
131. US GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-561, NURSING HOME QUALITY:
PREVALENCE OF SERIOUS PROBLEMS, WHILE DECLINING, REINFORCES IMPORTANCE OF
ENHANCED OVERSIGHT 4-5 (2003) [hereinafter PREVALENCE OF SERIOUS PROBLEMS].
132. 42 C.F.R. § 488.305(b) (2014) (“The State survey agency’s failure to follow the
procedures set forth in this section [regarding the resident sample, surveying the quality of care,
auditing assessments and care plans and assessing compliance with resident’s rights
requirements] will not invalidate otherwise legitimate determinations that a facility’s deficiencies
exist.”); 42 C.F.R. § 488.318 (Failure to “cite only valid deficiencies,” “conduct surveys in
accordance with [regulations]” or use the forms, procedures, protocols, standards and methods
specified by CMS “does not . . . . invalidate adequately documented deficiencies.”). Note,
however, that a state may be denied federal funding if it conducts surveys in violation of such
requirements 42 C.F.R. § 442.30(a)(1) (2014). Moreover, a provider agreement is not valid
evidence of compliance if the survey is not performed in accordance with federal requirements.
42 C.F.R. § 442.30(a)(5).
133. Cf, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594, 600 (1993)
(Overarching test of admissibility of evidence under Rule 702 is “scientific validity–and thus the
evidentiary relevance and reliability–of the principles that underlie a proposed submission.” Court
must assess “whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically
valid,” by considering, among other things “whether it can be (and has been) tested” empirically,
“the known or potential rate of error . . . and the existence and maintenance of standards
controlling the technique’s operation”); Schering Corp. v. Pfizer, 189 F.3d 218, 234 (2d Cir.
1999) (noting that courts deciding whether to admit surveys in these circumstances should
therefore examine their trustworthiness–and ultimately their weight, if admitted–both in terms of
their methodological strengths and in terms of their proneness to faulty memory and perception.);
Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1189, 1205 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (“The
trustworthiness of surveys depend upon foundation evidence that (1) the “universe” was properly
defined, (2) a representative sample the universe selected, (3) the questions to be asked of
interviewees were framed in a clear, precise and non-leading manner, (4) sound interview
procedures were followed by competent interviewers who had no knowledge of the litigation or
the purpose for which the survey was conducted, (5) the data gathered was accurately reported,
(6) the data was analyzed in accordance with accepted statistical principles and (7) objectivity of
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is also fair to ask whether a private litigant asserting breach of contract would
be permitted to prove such a claim using evidence developed in derogation of
the breach assessment procedures required by the contract.
Significantly in light of later events, CMS’ RFP discussed the agency’s
view of the relative importance of consistent survey results and accurate survey
results. Recognizing that survey results might be consistent but inaccurate,
CMS made the seemingly obvious point that accurate survey results were the
prime objective, and consistency, although important, was secondary:
In general, we would expect a more consistent survey process to result in a
more accurate survey process. However, the goal of improving the consistency
of the survey process must not be attained at the expense of incurring a less
134
accurate survey.

CMS’ actions would belie that assertion before the redesign of the survey
protocol was complete.
In the same year that the RFP was issued by CMS, GAO again confirmed
that deficiency findings were unacceptably inconsistent. GAO also reiterated
that such inconsistency could not be explained by differences in quality:
[W]e have found considerable variation nationwide in the reporting of
deficiencies . . . such differences in reporting make comparisons across states
difficult since it cannot be determined whether observed differences are due to
135
real variations in quality or to inconsistent application of standards.

Thus, fifteen years after OBRA ’87 was adopted and twelve years after the
date by which the protocol was mandated to be tested and validated, it could
not be said that protocol accurately assessed quality. In 2002, as in 1984, when
the Tenth Circuit ordered the Secretary to promulgate an effective survey
methodology, the Secretary still had no basis to conclude that the government
was getting the quality care for which it was paying.136
Also in 2002, another GAO study reported that, when federal surveyors
conducted oversight surveys of state survey activities, the federal surveys
found substantially more serious problems than were found by the state:
[T]he subjective nature of the survey process means that the surveyors may
apply standards unevenly. Indeed we previously have reported that during
attempts to validate the findings of state surveyors, federal surveyors have

the entire process was assured. Failure to satisfy one or more of these criteria may lead to
exclusion of the survey”).
134. IMPROVING THE CONSISTENCY, supra note 128, at 4.
135. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-431R, NURSING HOMES:
EXPENDITURES AND QUALITY 4 (2002) [hereinafter EXPENDITURES AND QUALITY].
136. Estate of Smith v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 583, 591 (10th Cir. 1984); EXPENDITURES AND
QUALITY, supra note 135, at 11-12.
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found more than three times the number of serious care problems recorded by
137
state surveyors.

GAO failed to note, however, that the federal surveyors are required by law:
(1) to conduct the oversight survey in roughly the same time frame as the state
survey; and (2) to use the same survey tools and methodologies as the state
surveyors when conducting oversight surveys.138
In other words, the federal surveyors and the state surveyors were
mandated to conduct the nursing facility survey in precisely the same time
frame and in the same way. It would be reasonable to expect, therefore, that the
state survey and the federal survey would generate substantially similar, if not
approximately the same, results. Nonetheless, the federal and the state
surveyors obtained significantly different results despite using the same
nursing facility survey protocol. The significance of the discordance between
federal and state survey results ought not be minimized. Nor should it be
overlooked, that GAO’s report—as do all other federal studies—presumes
without either evidence or explanation that the federal surveyors’ results are
superior to those reported by the same state surveyors.
It is one thing to say that surveyors in different states and in different
regions of the country produce inconsistent results using the same survey
protocol. Although there is no evidence that explains inter-state differences, in
theory, at least, such differences might be attributed to—though not excused
by—differing standards of care, differences between facilities and resident
populations, differences in resources, differences in time and circumstances of
the survey, differences in public health status and other factors.
The difference between state and federal results, however, cannot be
explained by such factors. To the contrary, while inter-state comparisons are
affected by numerous variables, many of the circumstances intuitively most
likely to generate different results—inspection methodology, time, place,
residents and caregivers—are held relatively constant when federal and state
surveys are compared. It would seem that the federal-state differences are
indicative of the dominant role of surveyor discretion compounded by the fact
that, as the Abt Final Report concluded, the survey’s reliance on professional
judgment is misplaced because nursing judgment is not adequate to make the
complex decisions required by an outcome-based survey139

137. EXPENDITURES AND QUALITY, supra note 135, at 4.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(3)(A) (2012).
139. See generally FINAL REPORT, supra note 66.
Moreover, it ought to be noted that there is no guarantee that the complex outcome
analysis required by the survey process will be made by a nurse. The regulations require that the
team that conducts a standard survey include one registered nurse. However, the remainder of the
team is composed of interdisciplinary professionals. “Examples of professionals include
physicians, physician assistants, nurse practitioners, physical, speech or occupational therapists,
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One year later, in 2003, another GAO report addressed the reliability of the
nursing facility survey process. GAO also addressed actions proposed by CMS
to improve the validity and reliability of the survey process:
The agency [i.e., CMS] is committed to implementing only those portions of
the new methodology that are proven to be significantly more effective than
the current survey methodology.…We continue to believe that redesign of the
survey methodology, underway since 1998, is necessary for CMS to fully
respond to our past recommendation to improve the ability of surveys to
140
effectively identify the existence and extent of deficiencies.

In short, GAO acknowledged that the redesign of the survey process has been
underway for five years and, during that time that surveys have lacked the
ability “to effectively identify the existence and extent of deficiencies.”141
GAO treats the problem as a sterile administrative issue and ignores the
real-world consequences. There is no sense of urgency in GAO’s assessment.
More to the point, GAO fails to acknowledge that for thirteen years, consumers
have been relying on the survey to assure their health, safety, and welfare.
Likewise, care givers and providers—including individual nursing home
administrators and nurses—have had their performance evaluated and their
professional status determined based on a process repeatedly determined to be
ineffective and inaccurate. In other words, the Secretary still does not have a
means of determining whether federal dollars are paying for quality care. Yet,
for those “real people” who are most dependent on the survey process, the
issue is not economic, it is personal.
GAO’s critique was far from singular. In 2003 OIG again reiterated:
Our review of the survey process reveals that states differ in how they
determine both the number and type of deficiencies. . . As a result, we
conclude that nursing home survey results are not always consistent among
states, therefore limiting the comparability of the data. Further, we cannot
conclude whether trends in deficiencies are due to deteriorating care, variations
142
in the survey process, and/or increased enforcement.

Remarkably, although OIG alluded to “deteriorating care,” the number of
deficiency citations alleging poor care and citations at the highest severity
levels had both been dropping for several years.143 There was, in fact, no

registered professional nurses, dieticians, sanitarians, engineers, licensed practical nurses or social
worker.” 42 C.F.R. § 488.314(a)(2) (2014). Ultimately, however, the state decides “what
constitutes a professional subject to CMS’s approval.” 42 C.F.R. § 488.314(a)(3). CMS’s position
is that any trained surveyor can make any decision required by the survey protocol.
140. PREVALENCE OF SERIOUS PROBLEMS, supra note 131, at 38 n.50, 39.
141. Id. at 39.
142. U.S. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OEI-02-01-00600, NURSING HOME DEFICIENCY
TRENDS AND SURVEY AND CERTIFICATION PROCESS CONSISTENCY 7 (2003).
143. Id. at 10-11.
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empirical evidence that care was “deteriorating.” To the contrary, the only
basis for that assertion was speculation by CMS and other government
agencies that their actions should have resulted in greater numbers of
deficiencies.144 The possibility that efforts by regulators and the industry were
producing positive results seems to have received little serious consideration.
Like GAO, OIG made no comment on the significance of the problems with
the survey to nursing facility residents, on the propriety or legitimacy of
continuing to use such survey results to sanction providers or with respect to
whether the survey results could be used to distinguish between “good” and
“poor” facilities in the interim.145
A couple of years later, in 2005, GAO again emphasized problems with the
nursing facility nursing process and with the results of that process:
Inconsistency in states’ surveys is demonstrated by. . . continued wide
interstate variability in the proportion of homes found to have serious
deficiencies. For example, in the most recent time period, one state found such
deficiencies in about 6 percent of homes, whereas another state found them in
about 54 percent of homes. . . . In addition, state surveyors continue to
understate serious deficiencies as shown by the larger number of serious
deficiencies identified in federal comparative surveys than in state surveys of
146
the same home.

Once again, GAO failed to acknowledge that the state and federal surveyors
were required to conduct surveys of the same facilities in the same timeframe
and to use the same survey methodology and investigative protocol.
The obvious question is: on what basis can one conclude that a protocol,
which produces inaccurate results when utilized by trained professionals (i.e.,
state) surveyors, produces accurate results when utilized by similarly trained,
professional federal surveyors to assess the quality of care delivered to the
same patients by the same caregivers in approximately the same timeframe?
Arguably, those variations are indications of profound systemic defects in the
methodology used to assess quality by both state and federal surveyors, and not
necessarily to differences between individual surveyors. GAO simply assumes,

144. Id. at 2-3.
145. Id. at 2.
146. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-117, NURSING HOMES: DESPITE
INCREASED OVERSIGHT, CHALLENGES REMAIN IN ENSURING HIGH-QUALITY CARE AND
RESIDENT SAFETY 4 (2005) [hereinafter CHALLENGES REMAIN]. Below is the percentage of
nursing homes identified as having deficiencies discovered during state survey processes:

Id. at 4.

Percentage of Homes with Serious Deficiencies

Number of States

More Than 20 Percent
10 to 20 Percent
Less than 10 Percent

15
26
10
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again without explanation, that results reported by the federal survey teams
were accurate and that the states’ survey teams results were inaccurate. That
may, or may not, be correct, but no evidence is proffered supporting the
assumption.
In 2005, GAO also emphasized the point that IOM had made in 1986
regarding the importance of an accurate and reliable survey methodology:
Given the pivotal role played by surveys in helping to ensure nursing homes
residents receive high-quality care, the development and implementation of a
more rigorous survey methodology is one of the most important contributions
147
one can make to addressing oversight weaknesses.

The irony of GAO’s emphasis on the priority that ought to be given to assuring
an accurate and reliable survey methodology is made poignant by the context
in which the statement was made.
Specifically, CMS had been engaged in redesign of the survey
methodology to address the numerous criticisms made by government studies
since at least 1998, more than ten years after OBRA ’87 had mandated use of a
validated survey protocol. In 2005, however, CMS was not focused on fixing
the survey process. Instead, the development of a valid survey protocol took a
backseat to CMS’ initiative to roll out its Nursing Home Compare website.
Despite the obvious need for the long overdue accurate and valid survey
process—even ignoring that a valid survey protocol had been a statutory
priority since 1987—no justification was ever offered by CMS for prioritizing
the expenditure of time and capital on Nursing Home Compare. Indeed, CMS
seemed to perceive no need to explain the source of its claimed authority to set
priorities other than those dictated by Congress.
The Nursing Home Compare website—and the Five Star Quality Rating
System added to Nursing Home Compare in 2008—were designed to provide
consumers with information to allow comparison of the relative merits of one
nursing facility versus another. Both Nursing Home Compare and the Five Star
Quality Rating System rely to a significant extent on the very survey results
that GAO, OIG, and others had criticized as unreliable and inconsistent.148

147. Id. at 45.
148. See generally CHRISTIANNA WILLIAMS ET. AL., MEASURING NURSING HOME QUALITY
– THE FIVE-STAR RATING SYSTEM (2010). The survey results were not the only questionable data
utilized in CMS’s Five-Star Rating calculation. GAO emphatically pointed out that the Quality
Measures were not valid measures of quality and, indeed, were not derived from a valid quality
measurement assessment: “[I]t is not clear whether a resident who triggers a QM . . . is actually
receiving poor care. The lack of correlation among the QMs—a home may score well on some
QMs and poorly on others—also calls into question their validity as measures of overall quality.”
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-373, NURSING HOMES: FEDERAL ACTIONS
NEED TO IMPROVE TARGETING AND EVALUATION OF ASSISTANCE BY QUALITY IMPROVEMENT
ORGANIZATIONS 41-2 (2007) (footnote omitted). “The use of MDS data to measure the quality of
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Thus, despite the long-standing recognition that the survey results were
inaccurate and not clearly indicative of quality, CMS was engaged in a process
to expand consumer reliance on survey results by individuals making critical
decisions about where to obtain nursing facility care.
In fact, the “Technical User’s Guide” for the Nursing Home Compare
Five-Star Quality Rating System states that “[t]he survey rating is the most
important dimension in determining the [facility’s] overall rating.”149
According to the individuals who designed the Nursing Home Compare FiveStar Quality Rating System, survey results were given disproportionally
heavier weight in the Five-Star calculation because CMS wanted it that way:
CMS wanted the health inspection domain to play a predominant role in
determining the overall 5-star rating. The main reason for this is that, unlike
the staffing and quality measure domains, which are based on data selfreported by nursing homes, independent surveyors carry out the health
150
inspection; thus, the data should be more objective and unbiased.

CMS, of course, knew that the data was neither “objective” nor “unbiased.”
CMS had over ten years of government and government-sponsored reports to
that effect beginning with the Preliminary Report issued by CMS’ contractor,
Abt Associates in 1993.151
To be clear, CMS insisted that survey results play a “predominant role” in
the ratings published on Nursing Home Care, and it urged consumers to use
Nursing Home Care in making care decisions despite certain knowledge that
survey results were inaccurate and that variation in survey results could not be
attributed to quality difference between facilities. Indeed, those inaccuracies
were so deeply embedded in the survey system that CMS had been engaged in
redesigning the survey protocol for approximately seven years.152 The
problems with the survey system were serious enough that CMS had spent
almost five million dollars on the redesign in only the first four years of the
eight-year project.153 Moreover, rather than prioritize the development of a
valid survey methodology, CMS insisted on moving forward and making the

care in nursing home is problematic because the MDS was not designed as a quality measurement
tool and does not reflect advances in clinical practice.” Id. at 43.
149. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., DESIGN FOR NURSING HOME COMPARE
FIVE-STAR QUALITY RATING SYSTEM: TECHNICAL USER’S GUIDE 15 (2012).
150. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 148 at 4.
151. See generally Administrative Record, supra note 122. See also FINAL REPORT, supra
note 66, at 1 (discussing significant concerns with surveyor discretion); CMS REPORT. supra note
82, at 75 (published in 1998 and discussing “self-report bias” among nursing home
administrators); OIG OEI-02-99-00060, supra note 91, at 4 (published in 1999 and discussing the
HCFA’s reliance on the Online Survey Certification and Reporting System and its self-reported
data).
152. CHALLENGES REMAIN, supra note 146, at 45 (2005).
153. Id. at 42.
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Nursing Home Compare Website available to consumers despite GAO’s
objection that the data utilized in the website was misleading and inaccurate.154
In 2006, CMS announced an improved survey process called the Quality
Indicator Survey, or “QIS.” CMS’ memorandum introducing the QIS stated:
The CMS recognized the need to improve the consistency and effectiveness of
the nursing home standard survey process and awarded a contract in 1998 to
develop improvements to that process. . . . Improvements to the survey process
are incorporated into fundamentally revised survey called the Quality Indicator
Survey (QIS). The objectives of the QIS process include: Improve consistency
and accuracy of quality of care and quality of life problem identification by
155
using a more structured process. . . .

Thus, according to CMS, the new QIS would improve both consistency and
accuracy of survey findings.
According to CMS, one innovation in the QIS Survey was the
identification of “a set of Quality of Care Indicators (QCIs) specific to each
surveyed facility, which are compared to national norms and used to identify
care areas for systematic investigations.”156 Testing of the new QIS process
was still underway. Nonetheless, CMS stated that “[a]lthough we have not
received final results from the evaluation of the QIS, the preliminary
information received is very positive and indicates that it is time to
strategically move forward with plans to implement the QIS process in a
estimated eight to ten . . . selected States[]” in addition to the five states where
QIS already had been implemented.157

154. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-187, NURSING HOMES: PUBLIC
REPORTING OF QUALITY INDICATORS HAS MERIT, BUT NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION IS
PREMATURE 4 (2002). Notably GAO’s objection to publication was not based on the welldocumented inaccuracies and inconsistency in the survey findings that CMS made a dominant
factor in the analysis. Instead, GAO questioned the accuracy of the data used to determine another
element in the calculation, the quality measures. Id. at 3. GAO also questioned whether the
quality indicators had been appropriately validated. Id. at 21.
155. SURVEY & CERTIFICATION GROUP, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SRVS., S&C-0709, SOLICITATION OF STATE SURVEY AGENCY PARTICIPATION IN QUALITY INDICATOR SURVEY
(QIS) IMPLEMENTATION 1-2 (2006).
156. Id. at 2.
157. Id. at 3. See also SURVEY & CERTIFICATION GROUP, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SRVS., S&C-07-09, FYI - RELEASE OF BROCHURE DESCRIBING THE QUALITY
INDICATOR SURVEY (QIS) DEMONSTRATION PROJECT 1 (2005) (“Initial testing of the QIS
process has revealed it yields increased consistency and improved documentation of survey
findings”). Note that CMS made no claim that initial testing reported improved accuracy, despite
that “improve[d] . . . accuracy of quality of care and quality of life problem identification” was
one of the prime objectives of the redesign of the survey process. Id. See also ABT ASSOCIATES &
VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY, EVALUATION OF THE QUALITY INDICATOR SURVEY (QIS): FINAL
REPORT at ii (2007) [hereinafter QIS EVALUATION REPORT] (“Improved accuracy of quality of
care and quality of life problem identification is one of the objectives of the QIS”).
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Although CMS characterized the QIS’s reliance on quality indicators as a
“fundamentally revised survey,” the requirement to conduct the survey based
on quality indicators was long-standing: IOM’s 1986 Report had recommended
and OBRA ’87 required “a survey of the quality of care furnished, as measured
by indicators of medical, nursing, and rehabilitative care, dietary and nutrition
services, activities and social participation, and sanitation, infection control,
and the physical environment.”158 OBRA ’87 incorporated the
recommendations requiring “a survey of the quality of care furnished, as
measured by indicators of Medicaid nursing and rehabilitative care . . . among
others.”159
It soon became apparent that CMS had acted and spoken too soon when
promising improved accuracy and consistency. Significant problems with both
accuracy and consistency were observed when the QIS process was fully
tested.
The Final Report of the “Evaluation of the Quality Indicator Survey (QIS)”
(QIS Evaluation Report) was published in December 2007.160 The QIS
Evaluation Report first described the purposes, objective, and methodology of
the evaluation and then the results.
According to the QIS Evaluation Report:
The QIS is a revised long-term care survey process that was developed under
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) oversight through a
multi-year contract. It represents an effort to standardize how the survey
process measures nursing home compliance with federal standards and the
interpretative guidelines that define those standards. The QIS demonstration
represents the culmination of 15 years of CMS-sponsored research and
development aimed at addressing criticisms of long-term care survey process
raised by consumers, providers, the General Accounting Office, Congress,
161
survey agencies, and CMS Central Office.

Among other things, “[i]mproved accuracy of quality of care and quality of life
problem identification [was] one of the objectives of the QIS.”162 QIS was

158. Compare IOM REPORT, supra note 6, at 34 (“[t]he standard survey should rely on ‘key
indicators’ of quality of resident life and care . . .”), and id. at 113-14 (“[t]he standard survey
would be designed to use ‘key indicators’ of performance to identify facilities with poor resident
outcomes that might have resulted from substandard nursing home performance[ ]”), and id. at
116-17 (discussing use of key indicators), and id. at 378-88 (discussing key indicators and
operational usage), with 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(2)(A)(ii) (2012) (specifying content of standard
survey and requiring use quality indictors), and 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(g)(2)(A)(ii) (2012) (also
specifying content of standard survey and requiring use quality indictors).
159. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(g)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
160. See QIS EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 157.
161. Id. at i.
162. Id. at ii.
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“expected to yield more valid inferences about the care provided to residents
and systems of care.”163
The QIS Evaluation Report assessed whether the QIS was more accurate
than the standard survey by comparing facility quality measured by QIS with
quality as measured by findings made using the traditional standard survey
protocol.164 Evaluation researchers visited a sample of nursing facilities to
collect data at the same time that the facility was undergoing a standard
survey.165 The Evaluation researchers worked independently of the surveyors
to collect data regarding seventy-five “Care Indicators” (CIs) addressing five
quality domains: incontinence, nutrition, pressure ulcers, choice, and
activities.166 In contrast, OBRA ’87 requires use of quality indicators assessing
thirteen quality domains: “medical, nursing, and rehabilitative care, dietary and
nutrition services, activities and social participation, and sanitation, infection
control, and the physical environment,” as well as the accuracy of resident
assessments, adequacy of care plans, and resident rights.167 After completion of
data collection, the QIS Evaluation assessed:
How well the QIS achieved its primary objective of improving the accuracy,
consistency, and documentation of the nursing home survey process within
existing survey resources. The CIs addressed [five] research questions:
 Does the QIS lead to increased accuracy? . . . [The CIs] give measures of
the quality of care provided by the nursing home that can be compared to
surveyor findings to determine whether there is more agreement between
surveyor findings and the quality indicators for QIS or Standard surveys. If
the QIS is more accurate than the Standard survey, then we expect that there
would be a higher level of agreement between QIS survey results and the
quality indictors than for Standard surveys.
 Does the QIS result in improved documentation of survey deficiencies? . . .
We used content analysis to compare the quality of documentation . . . for a
sample of CMS 2567 [Survey Report] Forms from QIS and Standard
surveys, using a blind review process to measure whether the
documentation supports the specific F-tag, scope and severity that was
cited.
 How does the time required to complete the QIS compare to the time
required for the current survey? A key research question is whether the QIS
requires more surveyor time than the current survey process. Using data
from the CMS-670 form, we analyzed how QIS time compared to the time

163. Id.
164. Id. at iii.
165. Id. at ii, iv (explaining that the data was collected by reviewing the resident’s medical
record, interviewing the resident and observing the resident in a variety of care-related activities).
166. Id. at ii.
167. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(2)(A)(ii)(I)-(II) (2012).
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for the facility’s prior survey and to Standard surveys at similar
facilities. . . .
 How does the QIS impact the number and types of deficiencies that are
cited? Analysis of survey deficiencies was used to examine the impact of
the QIS on the number and scope/severity of deficiencies cited and also
whether the QIS is associated with changes in the types of regulatory care
issues that are cited.
 Does the QIS improve surveyor efficiency? One of the objectives of the QIS
is to improve the efficiency of surveyors . . . . We analyze the relationship
between time and outcomes to measure whether the QIS is associated with
changes in how well surveyor time is targeted to facilities with more quality
problems.

The answers to the research questions were not what CMS had seemed to
promise when it asserted that “it [was] time to strategically move forward with
plans to implement the QIS process.”168
The QIS Evaluation Report concluded that, with respect to at least four of
the five areas studied, the QIS was not an improvement over the standard
survey.169 The QIS Evaluation Report summarized the evaluation’s
conclusions separately for each of the five questions investigated:
 Does the QIS lead to increased accuracy? [W]e did not find evidence that
the QIS was more accurate than the Standard survey. . . . Ultimately, under
both types of surveys, there appears to be a great deal of surveyor discretion
170
and judgment that influences the decision to cite.

168. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SOLICITATION OF STATE SURVEY AGENCY
PARTICIPATION IN QUALITY INDICATOR SURVEY (QIS) IMPLEMENTATION MEMORANDUM 3
(Dec. 21, 2006) [hereinafter CMS QIS MEMORANDUM]. Although CMS asserted in the QIS
Memorandum that preliminary results were “very positive,” that is hard to believe in light of the
final results. Id. at 116. Moreover, as discussed earlier, the roll out of Nursing Home Compare
demonstrates CMS’s willingness to take actions despite empirical evidence.
169. QIS EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 157, at 13-14 The conclusion section of the QIS
Evaluation Report opens with the sentence: “The results of the evaluation were mixed and do not
lead to firm conclusions about the effectiveness of the QIS.” That statement is belied by the
Report’s actual answers to each of the questions and by the Report’s discussion of the
implications of those answers. For example, with respect to the accuracy of the QIS compared to
the standard survey, the QIS Evaluation Report is unequivocal: “We did not find evidence that the
QIS is more accurate than the Standard Survey. . .”.
170. The specific findings and implications reported by the QIS Evaluation Report with
respect to the accuracy of the QIS survey compared to the standard survey are excerpted below:
Results
“In general, we did not find any difference in accuracy for the QIS and Standard surveys.
 The QIS and Standard survey samples were comparable with respect to overall
quality and survey deficiencies cited. The two groups were also similar with
respect to the frequency of Ftag citations of a scope beyond isolated . . .

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

124

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 8:89

 The overall failure rate on the CIs was high. The overall fail rate across all care
areas was 44 percent for the Standard sample and 45 percent for the QIS
sample. . . Across nursing homes, there was significant variability between CI fail
rates for all care areas that provided the opportunity to judge how the two survey
types discriminated quality with the Ftag citation system.
 Overall, the relationship between quality and survey deficiencies was low. We
found a positive but low correlation between the overall number of related Ftags
and quality as measured by the CI fail rate for both Standard and QIS surveyed
nursing homes. Neither QIS nor Standard surveys consistently documented that
providers failed to implement many of the care indicators recommended in the
investigative protocols. Some recommended quality measures were never or
rarely documented by either survey team in an Ftag statement despite the fact that
the majority of residents who were eligible for the care described in the guidelines
were found in this evaluation to not receive that care.
 There was no evidence of a stronger relationship between quality and deficiencies
for QIS surveys. We found that there were no differences in the ability of the QIS
and Standard surveys to detect quality problems . . .
 Findings suggested that more survey deficiencies with scope greater than isolated
could have been cited for both QIS and Standard surveys . . . Both types of
surveys failed to detect more than isolated problems in many facilities.
 There was no evidence that the QIS was more accurate with respect to survey
deficiencies with scope greater than isolated. The CIs identified 29 occasions that
would justify an Ftag greater than isolated across the Standard survey nursing
homes and 31 opportunities for QIS nursing homes. The Standard Survey teams
wrote greater than isolated Ftags in 15 out of these 29 opportunities (52 percent)
vs. 11 out of the 31 opportunities (35 percent) for QIS surveys.
 Both types of surveys failed to detect many residents with poor pressure ulcer and
weight loss outcomes. . . . Both types of surveys failed to detect many residents
who have poor pressure ulcer and weight loss outcomes and who also receive
poor care according to multiple data sources.”
Implications
“We did not find evidence that the QIS is more accurate than the Standard survey, despite
the fact that it has started the process of making the survey process more specific and
focused with its Stage I protocols and automated data entry system. . .[W]e do not believe
that a larger sample size would produce dramatically different results until further
refinements are made in the basic concepts that underlie the QIS and which make it
different from the Standard survey process . . . [W]e believe that the best explanation for
the lack of differences between the two survey methods is related to two issues: 1) the
specificity of the investigative guidelines and the critical element pathways, and 2) how
feasible or “user friendly” the critical element pathways and interpretative guidelines are
to implement. The various investigative documents used by both survey types vary in
specificity such that there is much interpretation left to the discretionary judgment of
surveyors. . .”
Id.
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 Does the QIS result in improved documentation of survey deficiencies? We
found essentially no difference in documentation quality associated with the
171
QIS . . . .
 How does the time required to complete the QIS compare to the time
required for the current survey? We found that the QIS took considerably
longer to complete than Standard surveys in two of the five demonstration
states; two states consumed about the same amount of time and one state’s
172
time was open to different interpretations.

171. The specific findings and implications reported by the QIS Evaluation Report with
respect to documentation of survey findings in QIS surveys compared to standard survey are
excerpted below:
Results
“[O]verall there was essentially no evidence that the QIS leads to higher quality deficiency
documentation. Nor was there any evidence that the QIS led to an overall increase in the citation
of related Ftags:
 Standard surveys were more likely to include both a deficiency statement and a
related outcome. Overall, 33 percent of Standard survey Ftags reviewed [were]
noted to include both a deficient statement and a related outcome, while 21
percent of QIS Ftags reviewed met this standard. QIS survey process deficiencies
, such as assessment (F272) and care planning (F279) deficiencies, were more
frequently accompanied by their related outcome tags than were Standard survey
deficiencies, but, for outcome deficiencies (e.g., pressure ulcer development,
F314), Standard surveys were more frequently accompanied by related process
deficiencies than were QIS outcome deficiencies.
 QIS deficiencies tended to cite more types of evidence than Standard deficiencies.
QIS Ftags reviewed cited as many or more types of evidence in general, for both
process and outcome tags.
 There was little difference with respect to the quantity of evidence
cited. . . .California and Ohio QIS surveys referenced a higher number of data
points than their Standard survey counterparts, while fewer data points were cited
on Louisiana QIS surveys.
 There was no evidence that the QIS was associated with citation of additional
related Ftags. The review of [Critical Element] Pathways [guiding QIS
surveyors’ reviews] did not reveal significant differences between the “related
Ftags” cited on QIS vs. Standard surveys. . .
Implications
“While there is no concrete evidence that a reasonable level of inter-rater reliability was
achieved prior to the review nor sustained during the review, the reviewers were
experienced surveyors who participated in the development of the review protocol and
guidance. The lack of a systematic difference[] in documentation quality may reflect the
variable knowledge and skill of the surveyors under both the QIS and Standard survey,
which likely influences both the decision to cite and the supporting documentation[.]”
Id.
172. Id. at 13. The specific findings and implications reported by the QIS Evaluation
Report with respect to the “major evaluation question” (because implementation of QIS must
be resource neutral) of how the time to complete a QIS compares to the time required to
complete the current survey are excerpted below:
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 How does the QIS impact the number and types of deficiencies that are
cited? The results of this evaluation clearly indicated that the QIS cites
more deficiencies, at higher levels, and more in these usually under-cited
173
areas.

Results
“Results varied across States. . .
 For three states (California, Kansas, Ohio), the QIS took longer than the prior
Standard survey at the same facilities – the pre-post differences were
especially large in California and Kansas. . .
 In Connecticut and Louisiana, the QIS was completed more quickly than the
prior survey at the facility. . .
 Exclusion of outliers does not change basic conclusions regarding QIS
completion time. There were some QIS surveys that took an extraordinarily
long time to complete, in some cases 200 or more hours. All but one of these
surveys was in California and Kansas. The explanation for the high
completion times varied. . .
 The changes to the QIS implemented after the formative evaluation reduced
QIS time requirements. The changes to the QIS implemented after the
formative evaluation appeared to lead to modest reductions in the time
required to complete QIS surveys.”
Id. at 8–9.
Implications
“. . .[W]hile we do have conclusions about how long QIS surveys took to complete in
each of the demonstration states, we do not offer conclusions about the time
requirements of the QIS in other states. The likelihood is that there will be some
states for which the QIS does not take any longer to complete than Standard surveys
and others that struggle to implement the QIS and find that is does take longer.”
Id. at 10.
173. Id. at 14. The specific findings and implications reported by the QIS Evaluation
Report with respect to how the QIS impacted the numbers and types of deficiencies cited are
excerpted below:
“Results
 The QIS was associated with an increase in the number of survey
deficiencies: . . . [W]e estimate that the QIS was associated with 1.6 additional
deficiencies in California (a 14 percent increase), 0.6 fewer deficiencies in
Connecticut (a 9 percent decrease), 9.4 additional deficiencies in Kansas (a 99
percent increase), 1.9 additional deficiencies in Louisiana (a 29 percent
increase), and 2.4 additional deficiencies in Ohio (a 52 percent increase).
 The QIS was associated with an increase in G-level deficiencies: We also
examined the impact of the QIS on deficiencies cited at the G-level or above
(G, H, I, J, K, L). The rate of G-level deficiencies was relatively small for both
types of surveys, but the QIS was associated with large increases in Kansas,
and Ohio and a large decline in Connecticut. There was a slight increase in
California and relatively little change in Louisiana.
 The QIS was associated with an increase in the regulatory care areas cited:
One of the objectives of the QIS is to comprehensively review a wide range
of regulatory care areas. In all five states, there were more regulatory care
areas cited on QIS survey than on the prior survey at the facility. For all
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 Does the QIS improve surveyor efficiency? Ohio was the only state for
174
which the QIS was associated with an increase in surveyor efficiency.

To summarize, after almost ten years and millions of dollars had been invested
in developing a new survey methodology, the QIS survey did not result in
more accurate and valid survey determinations than the traditional survey.
Further, the QIS did not improve the survey process in most other areas studied
compared to the current standard survey.
Remarkably, without acknowledging the overlap, the QIS Evaluation
Report concluded that “the best explanation for the lack of differences [in
accuracy and validity] between the two survey methods” lay in three
problems—all of which Abt had identified as systemic defects in the original
survey methodology in its 1996 Final Report.175 First, the “investigative

regulatory care areas except for infection, facilities were more likely to
receive a deficiency with the QIS survey than with their prior survey. For
some regulatory care areas (resident rights, quality of life, dietary care,
physician services, dental care, physical environment), the differences were
substantial.”
Id. at 11.
Implications
“. . .The analysis provides strong support for the hypothesis that the QIS leads to an
increase in the number of survey deficiencies and an increase in the regulatory care
areas that surveyors cite, supporting expectations about the QIS. These are an
important finding given the studies by the General Accounting Office (GAO) and
Office of the Inspector General (OIG) that have found that the Standard survey under
reports deficiencies, harm-level deficiencies, quality of life, resident rights, and
dental deficiencies. As a practical matter it would be difficult to implement any
system that results in several fold increases in deficiencies, but this is not in general the
case although the increase observed for Kansas QIS surveys may be a reason for
concern.
“A potential limitation of this analysis is that we are unable to control for surveyor
quality. QIS surveyors were chosen to participate in the demonstration because of
their experience. It may be that the QIS teams have higher citation rates than other
survey teams, and that this may explain some of the increase in survey deficiencies
that we observed for QIS surveys.”
Id. at 12.
174. Id. at 14. The specific findings and implications reported by the QIS Evaluation Report
with respect to whether the QIS improved surveyor efficiency compared to surveyor performance
when conducting the standard survey are excerpted below:
Results
“. . .[T]he only state in which the QIS was associated with an increase in surveyor
efficiency (as measured by the relationship between time and survey outcomes) was
Ohio. . . The patterns that we observed on Ohio suggest that the QIS has the potential to
improve surveyor targeting to facilities with the most quality problems, but the experience
of the other states suggests that this need not be the case.”
Id. at 13.
175. Id., at 5; see also FINAL REPORT., supra note 66, at 222–23.
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guidelines and critical element pathways” intended to guide surveyor decisionmaking were not sufficiently specific. Second, the guidelines and pathways
were difficult to implement. Finally, and as a result “there is much
interpretation left to the discretionary judgment of the surveyors.”176 The
unvarnished truth was that, despite being repeatedly told that the survey
guidelines lacked specificity, were difficult to apply and left complex outcomerelated decisions to the discretion and “professional judgment” of surveyors
who lacked the ability to make such decisions, CMS officials later admitted
that “surveyor guidelines on identifying deficiencies were not changed due to
the implementation of the QIS.”177
Although CMS relied on the Evaluation—albeit the Evaluation’s
preliminary results—as a basis to move forward with implementation of QIS
and away from the standard survey, the final QIS Evaluation Report actually
rejected CMS’ approach. Rather than supporting a change in survey processes,
the QIS Evaluation Report stated that its findings were “limited by a small
sample size; thus the data we provide are best used for survey improvement
purposes rather than to inform a decision about what type of survey process to
use.”178 Just as it had ignored GAO and proceeded with Nursing Home
Compare despite its reliance on flawed data, CMS proceeded to implement
QIS notwithstanding the flaws identified in the QIS Evaluation Report.
Despite having previously acknowledged the importance of accurate and
consistent survey results and despite having assured that the QIS process
would improve both consistency and accuracy, CMS reconsidered and
retreated following publication of the QIS Evaluation Report in December
2007. In 2008, CMS told GAO that:
The QIS is not likely to increase the accuracy of deficiency identification. . . .
But we do expect the QIS will increase the consistency of survey process both
179
between States and within States. . . .

CMS’ underlying assumption, of course, was directly contrary to what CMS
had previously said: that accuracy and consistency of survey results both were
important, but accuracy was the overarching goal. Now, however, CMS
claimed that improved consistency in survey results made the process
significantly better even if there was no improvement in accuracy of results.

176. QIS EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 157, at v.
177. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-403R, NURSING HOME QUALITY:
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE QUALITY INDICATOR SURVEY 19 (2011) [hereinafter SURVEY
IMPLEMENTATION].
178. QIS EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 157, at v.
179. Letter from Vincent J. Vehtimiglia, Jr. to John Dicken (May 2, 2008), in U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-517, NURSING HOMES: FEDERAL MONITORING SURVEY
DEMONSTRATE CONTINUED SERIOUS CARE PROBLEMS AND CMS OVERSIGHT WEAKNESSES
(2011) [hereinafter OVERSIGHT WEAKNESSES].
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The following year GAO rejected CMS’ assumption that improving
consistency without improving accuracy was an acceptable outcome. To the
contrary, GAO reiterated that consistency might be important, but the QIS
must be accurate:
[T]he evaluation [of the QIS methodology] did not find that QIS methodology
increased survey accuracy, noting that QIS and traditional survey samples
were comparable in overall quality and in the frequency of standards cited for
deficiencies with either a pattern or widespread scope. . . . While improving
the consistency of the survey process is important, CMS must also focus on
180
addressing the accuracy of QIS surveys.

GAO continued, emphasizing that:
Survey methodology and guidance are integral to reliable nursing home
surveys, and we found that weaknesses in these areas were linked to
understatement . . . surveyors noted that surveys were too lengthy, complex,
181
and subjective.

GAO might be entitled to claim credit for the insight if it were not for the fact
that the exact same criticisms of the survey process had been leveled years
prior to the adoption of OBRA ’87.182
The OBRA ’87 mandate that surveys be conducted using a protocol that
had been designed, tested, and validated prior to use was specifically directed
to eliminate one of the major causes of inconsistent and inaccurate survey
performance. Moreover, GAO exhibits the same myopia that increasingly
affects those evaluating the survey process: GAO asserts that problems in the
survey process result in understatement of quality problems, but ignores the
possibility that systemic methodological defects also result in overstatement of
deficiencies. An accurate survey process must both “identify deficiencies” and
“[c]ite only valid deficiencies.”183
Indeed, at the same time that GAO, OIG, and CMS’ consultants were
focusing on under-citation, experience strongly suggested that the systemic
issues were pervasive because false-positive citations were evident at the
individual facility and state level. By law, nursing facilities issued deficiencies
during a survey have a right to ask state survey agencies to reconsider such
citations.184 The process, known as Informal Dispute Resolution (IDR) can
take various forms. However, at the first level, the IDR is non-adversarial.
Nevertheless, government studies of the results of the IDR process found that a

180. SURVEY IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 177, at 19.
181. Id.
182. See, Patricia A. Butler, Assuring the Quality of Care in Nursing Homes, 57 N. CAR. L.
REV. 1318, 1327-337 (1979); Robert N. Brown, An Appraisal of the Nursing Home Enforcement
Process, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 304, 314-20, 324–38 (1975).
183. 42 C.F.R. § 488.318 (2014).
184. 42 C.F.R. § 488.331 (2014).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

130

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 8:89

significant numbers of deficiency citations were either eliminated or modified
at the first level review.
Specifically, a 2009 GAO study found:
16 IDRs were requested per 100 homes in fiscal year 2007, with this number
ranging among states from 0 to 57 per 100 homes. For IDRs occurring in fiscal
year 2007, 20 percent of disputed deficiencies were deleted and 7 percent were
downgraded in scope or severity, but in 4 states at least 40 percent of disputed
185
deficiencies were deleted through this process.

GAO’s findings were generally consistent with the findings of a 2005 analysis
performed by the OIG.186 OIG found that forty-five percent of 1,211 disputed
deficiencies issued in fourteen states during 2002 were changed as a result of
IDR.187 Those changes included modification of the written citation (nineteen
percent), deletion of the citation (nineteen percent), and decrease in scope or
severity level (six percent).188
Thus, if nursing facilities were willing to challenge the deficiencies issued
in the survey process—and many facilities do not pursue such challenges for
reasons unrelated to their perception of the validity of the citation—between
twenty-five and forty percent of such deficiencies were either eliminated,
modified or downgraded.189 It bears emphasis that deficiencies are eliminated
or downgraded in significant numbers: (1) in a largely non-adversarial process;
and (2) generally by the state survey agency that issued the citation in the first
place. The obvious question is whether an average error rate of approximately
twenty-five to forty percent would be acceptable—or permitted—in any other
law enforcement environment. There is irony in that, despite findings

185. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-70, NURSING HOMES: ADDRESSING
FACTORS UNDERLYING UNDERSTATEMENT OF SERIOUS CARE PROBLEMS REQUIRES
SUSTAINED CMS & STATE COMMITMENT 42-43 (2009).
186. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI-06-0200750, INFORMAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR NURSING FACILITIES (2005) [hereinafter
INFORMAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION].
187. Id. at 12.
188. Id. See Dana B. Mukamel et al., Nursing Homes Appeals of Deficiencies: The Informal
Dispute Resolution Process 13 J. AM. MED. DIRS. ASSOC. 512, 514 (2012) (finding that in the
period 2005-2008, 9.8 percent of all annual surveys and 9.1 percent of all complaints resulted in
an IDR request but that there was large variability across states in the rate of which IDR was
requested with 30 percent of surveys resulting in an IDR request in some states).
CMS also has reported: “The quality and/or level of deficiency review may also affect the
deficiencies cited by various States. . . . Some States have an intense deficiency review and
carefully scrutinize each deficiency. The percentage of deficiencies rewritten as a result of the
State survey agency review process ranged from 1 percent to 90 percent. Most States noted that
this was a guess. Forty-four States reported the percentage of deficiencies that were withdrawn by
their review mechanism in calendar year 1996. The percentages ranged from 1 percent to 25
percent.” CMS REPORT, supra note 82, at 551-52.
189. INFORMAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION., supra note 186, at iii, 22.
THE
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suggesting that significant over-citation might be a problem as well as an
understatement, GAO titled its report “Nursing Homes: Addressing the Factors
Underlying Understatement of Serious Care Problems Requires Sustained
CMS and State Commitment.”
Some in Congress also began to notice. In 2010, a bill titled “Improving
the Quality of Care in Nursing Home Act of 2010” was introduced in
Congress. Although the bill was never adopted, the findings section of the
proposed legislation is instructive:
Sec 2 Findings: Since the enactment of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1987, there has been little systematic evaluation or review of the
effectiveness of the survey and certification system in measuring and
improving the quality of care for nursing home residents as well as ensuring
compliance with the requirements of participation by nursing homes
190
participating in Medicare or Medicaid.

The bill’s assertions regarding the failure to evaluate the survey system—
despite OBRA ’87’s mandate to validate the protocol and for the Secretary and
the states to implement programs to improve consistency—is, to say the least,
ironic.
That irony was made even more poignant by GAO’s April 2010 update191
of its 2008 study, “Nursing Homes: Federal Monitoring Surveys Demonstrate
Continued Understatement of Serious Care Problems and CMS Oversight
Weaknesses.”192 Although the update, like the original study, assumes that
differences in the results of state and federal surveys were attributable to poor
performance by state surveyors and that understatement of deficiencies193 was
the only problem with the survey process, the data on which the update relies
confirms continued, profoundly serious and significant inconsistencies in
survey results. Indeed, the data highlights that the inconsistencies were not
merely between federal and state survey results, but also prevalent between
states. Moreover, GAO states that the range of fluctuation in the results over
several years makes “the longer-term trend unclear.”194
For example, GAO’s 2010 update reported that, when federal government
inspectors visited the same nursing facilities recently inspected by state
inspectors and conducted a second “comparative” assessment of the quality of
190. Improving the Quality of Care in Nursing Homes Act of 2010, S. 3407, 111th Cong. §
2(3) (2010).
191. See Letter from John E. Dicken, Director of Health Care, United States Gov’t
Accountability Office, to Senators Herb Kohl and Charles E. Greasley, GAO-10-434R, Nursing
Homes: Some Improvement Seen in Understatement of Serious Deficiencies, but Implications for
the Longer-Term Trend Are Unclear (Apr. 28, 2010) [hereinafter “GAO Update”].
192. See generally OVERSIGHT WEAKNESSES, supra note 179.
193. Defined by GAO as: (1) failure to cite problems; and (2) understatement of scope or
severity. GAO Update, supra note 191, at 1.
194. Id. at 2.
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care, the percentage differences in serious deficiency violations found by
federal versus state inspectors nationally between 2002 and 2008 fluctuated
“from as low as 11.1 percent to as high as 17.5 percent . . .” with 12.3 percent
of the state surveys failing to cite at least one serious deficiency identified by
the federal comparative survey.195 Moreover, differences with respect to less
serious deficiencies existed, on average, in about seventy percent of the federal
surveys in the period.196 In 2008, however, differences in less serious
deficiency citations were observed in 74.8 percent of the state inspections
compared with the federal comparative survey.197
A wide range of variation in the alleged under-citation rates between
individual states also is evident in the data, for both serious and less serious
deficiencies. The range of variation in the federal and state inspections with
respect to serious deficiency citations between 2002-2008 was reported as
running from a low of zero in six states (Oregon, Alaska, Idaho, North Dakota,
Maine and Vermont) to highs of twenty-eight to thirty-five percent in three
states (Missouri, South Carolina and South Dakota).198 Nineteen states failed to
cite serious deficiencies allegedly identified by the federal surveyors in less
than ten percent of the state surveys, while thirteen states failed to cite such
deficiencies in twenty percent or more of the surveys.199 With respect to less
serious deficiencies in the same period, the state inspections cited fewer such
deficiencies, on the low end, in twenty percent of the surveys in West Virginia,
38.5 percent of the surveys in Alaska, and 30.8 percent of the surveys in
Wisconsin, to a high of 100 percent of the inspections conducted in Montana,
South Dakota, and Utah.200 Twenty-one states cited fewer less serious
deficiencies than the comparative federal survey in seventy-five or greater
percent of their surveys.201
Discussing the comparability of federal and state survey results, GAO
noted that:
By statute, comparative [federal] surveys must be conducted within 2 months
of the completion of the state survey. However, differences in timing, selection
of residents for the survey sample, and staffing can make analysis of
differences between the state and federal comparative surveys difficult. On the
basis of our prior recommendations, CMS now calls for the length of time
between the state and federal surveys to be between 10 and 30 working days
and requires federal surveyors conducting a comparative survey to include at
least half of the state survey’s sample of residents from that nursing home in
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the comparative survey sample, making it easier to determine whether state
surveyors missed a deficiency. Furthermore, federal comparative survey teams
202
are expected to mimic the number of staff assigned to the state survey.

GAO did not mention, however, that federal and state surveyors receive the
same training, that the state surveyors are equally qualified professionals, and
that the same survey procedures, forms, and protocols used by the state
surveyors must, by law, be used to conduct the federal comparative surveys.203
It is, of course, possible that the variation in the state survey results and the
results of federal comparative surveys exists despite that the federal and state
surveyors have the same training and qualifications, survey the same facilities,
conduct the survey within days of one another, assess the care provided by
roughly the same care givers to roughly the same residents,204 and utilize the
same survey procedures, forms, and protocols to conduct the survey due to
failings on the part of state surveyors and that the federal surveyors are the socalled “gold standard” of nursing facility survey performance. There is no
evidence that is the case, however. Intuitively, one could justifiably wonder if
the range of discrepancies between federal and state survey results suggests
that it is the federal survey results that are problematic. Indeed, superficially,
the state survey results seem to align with one another better than they do with
the results of the federal comparative surveys. Alternatively, an objective
observer might legitimately ask if the real cause of the variation is a systemic
problem with the survey system’s assessment tools that assures that survey
findings are not reproducible.
In a February 2012 report, GAO again made several points regarding the
implementation of the QIS. GAO noted that CMS had developed the QIS to
address weaknesses—including problems with accurate assessment of quality–
in the traditional survey:
According to CMS, the QIS was developed to help the agency meet several
objectives, including improving surveyors’ documentation of quality concerns;
improving the efficiency of the survey process by focusing resources on
facilities, and on areas within facilities, with the greatest quality concerns; and
improving the accuracy and consistency with which surveyors identify
205
deficiencies.

202. Id. at 4.
203. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(2)(D) (2012).
204. Average length of stay for short-term residents (approximately fifty percent of residents)
is approximately 23 days, for current residents, approximately 835 days, and for discharged
residents approximately 270 days. The National Nursing Home Survey: 2004 Overview, 13 CTR.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, June 2009, at 4, available at www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/
series/sr_13/sr_13_167.pdf.
205. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-214, NURSING HOME QUALITY: CMS
SHOULD IMPROVE EFFORTS TO MONITOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE QUALITY INDICATOR
SURVEY 2 (2012) [hereinafter QUALITY INDICATOR SURVEY].
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GAO then reviewed the results of the 2007 QIS Evaluation concluding:
In terms of whether the QIS led to improved accuracy or improved
documentation of deficiencies, the report found that the QIS-based routine
survey and the traditional survey approach generally led to comparable results.
The researchers, therefore, concluded that the QIS did not significantly
enhance or diminish surveyors’ ability to accurately identify or document
deficiencies. Similarly, the study suggested that in general, surveyors using the
QIS tool completed routine surveys as efficiently, as surveyors using the
206
traditional survey methodology.

GAO also noted that in 2009 CMS had commissioned a third study to evaluate
the QIS. That study, completed in 2011, “was intended to identify aspects of
the QIS that could affect how consistently surveyors identify quality problems
. . . .”207 According to GAO:
The study found that various aspects of the QIS process, including the way
resident interviews were conducted and the surveyor initiation process (in
which surveyors identify additional problem areas, not identified by the QIS
software, for further investigation during surveys), might affect the consistency
with which surveyors identify quality problems during nursing home
208
inspections.”

Stated more directly, the absence of specific guidelines governing surveyor
performance required the exercise of surveyor discretion to make important
decisions regarding how quality was assessed in the survey process—once
again, precisely the same issues Abt had originally raised in its 1993 and 1996
reports.
GAO noted that CMS had begun to implement the QIS nationally
following the 2007 QIS Evaluation Report. CMS “told [GAO that] they
worked to improve aspects of the QIS process by taking steps to address the
study’s findings and recommendations.”209 “CMS officials” likewise told GAO
“that they intend to consider the recommendations made in [the third] study
[completed in 2011] in their efforts to continue improving the QIS.”210
The remainder of GAO’s report makes clear that CMS had not taken the
steps necessary to keep those commitments. Noting that whether the QIS is
meeting its objectives requires performance monitoring—“a key component of
federal internal control standards”—GAO stated that CMS “acknowledged the
need for certain performance measures—specifically with regard to examining
the effect of the QIS on surveyor consistency—but noted that they did not have
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QUALITY INDICATOR SURVEY, supra note 205, at 9.
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performance goals or measure in place as of December 2011.”211 GAO
summarized:
[T]he agency has not established the means—such as performance goals and
measures—that would allow for routine, ongoing monitoring of the extent to
which the QIS is helping CMS improve the survey process as intended . . . .
While studies commissioned at key points can be valuable, the information
CMS would obtain on the QIS through routine monitoring is needed for this
212
ongoing effort.

Even more remarkable, GAO found that CMS had no systemic process of
assessing the accuracy and consistency of QIS results despite the requirements,
included in the Medicare and Medicaid Acts since 1987, that:
Each State and the Secretary shall implement programs to measure and reduce
213
inconsistency in the application of survey results among surveyors.

211. Id. at 9-10. In classic understatement, “performance goals and measures can affect
CMS’s ability to effectively monitor the OIS.” Id. at 12.
212. Id. at 20-21.
213. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3 (g)(2)(D) (2012). It bears some emphasis that when government
studies refer to inconsistency of survey results, the reference is to state-to-state variation. There is
no government study that examines whether inconsistency is a problem between surveys in the
same state, i.e., intra-state inconsistency. One non-government study found substantial intra-state
variations:
“Variation also exists within states. For example, the state of Kansas is composed of 6
survey regions. In 2001 facilities in the Northeast Region averaged 11.64 deficiencies,
nearly three times as many as facilities in the West Region (3.69 deficiencies). . .
Administrators and directors of nursing tended to think this heterogeneity reflected
differences in the survey process; surveyors thought it reflected differences in facility
characteristics.”
Robert H. Lee et al., Reliability of the Nursing Home Survey Process: A Simultaneous Survey
Approach, 46 GERONTOLOGIST 772, 772 (2006). The same study also reported substantial
differences between two different survey teams: looking at the same evidence:
“The variability interpretation notes that the two survey teams often reached different
conclusions about whether a deficiency existed, what regulation had been breached, the
scope of the deficiency, or the severity of the deficiency. These differences, furthermore,
might well have consequences. The penalties imposed by the survey agency, the career
prospects of facility managers, and the response of consumers are likely to be different for
a nursing home that gets 7 D deficiencies than for a nursing home that gets 12 D
deficiencies and 1 G.
“The same process can draw no deficiencies from one survey team and multiple
deficiencies from another. As a result, nursing home administrators and directors of
nursing cannot be confident that a good survey means that a process works
well. . .Improvement efforts are inhibited by a survey process that falls short of
systematic, replaceable data gathering and analysis.
“The variability of the survey also reduces its value to regulator and policy
makers. . . The many disagreements of these two teams about whether a regulation has
been breached, which regulation had been breached, and how serious the breach was
cannot make federal or state officials comfortable.
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In a March 2012 report, GAO again reiterated that there was no significant
difference between the results of the QIS process and the standard survey
originally adopted in the early 1990s to implement OBRA ’87.214 According to
GAO, following introduction of QIS in some states, CMS considered whether
to differentiate in its Nursing Home Compare Five-Star Quality Rating System
calculation between nursing facilities surveyed by QIS and those inspected
using the traditional methodology.215 CMS decided to make no distinction
because:
CMS examined whether the health inspection rating of facilities that were
inspected using the quality indicator survey differed from those that were
inspected with the traditional . . . survey. No significant difference was found
216
between the two approaches in conducting the survey. . . .

GAO noted that CMS justified use of the survey data in the Five-Star
Quality Rating calculation claiming, “the strengths of the surveys are that they
are conducted by trained individuals and follow national standards.”217 Of
course, years of GAO studies demonstrate that, training and national standards
notwithstanding, twenty-five years after the adoption of OBRA ’87 and the
mandate that the survey protocol was to be evidence-based, accurate and
reliable, those goals remain aspirational.
IV. BACK TO THE FUTURE AND AT THE END OF THE DAY
A.

Déjà Vu All Over Again

History gives those who hope to see CMS develop a survey protocol that
validly and accurately assesses quality little reason to be optimistic. The need
to revamp the survey process so that it validly and accurately assesses quality
of nursing facility care has been recognized for decades, long before OBRA
’87, and efforts to develop such an assessment tool have failed repeatedly. For
years, deep-seated political, methodological, philosophic, and other conflicts

This article suggests that surveyors need more specific criteria, in the form of
decision-making algorithms, to reduce the influence of individual perceptions. These
findings concur with other valuations of survey consistency (GAO, 2003b, Office of the
Inspector General, 2003, 2004).
Id. at 778.
214. QUALITY INDICATOR SURVEY, supra note 204, at 1; See generally U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-390, NURSING HOMES: CMS NEEDS MILESTONES &
TIMELINES TO ENSURE GOALS FOR THE FIVE-STAR QUALITY RATING SYS. ARE MET (2012)
[hereinafter CMS MILESTONES].
215. QUALITY INDICATOR SURVEY, supra note 205, at 16.
216. CMS MILESTONES, supra note 214, at 16.
217. Id. at 6. (“The primary goal of the Five-Star System is to help consumers make informed
decisions about their care by providing understandable and useful information on nursing home
quality.”)
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among those most directly affected have precluded development of an
effective quality assessment tool.218
Development of a valid and accurate survey protocol has been a “third
rail,” so politically sensitive that it has been unapproachable and certainly
untouchable. As a result, various interest groups tolerate a survey process that,
almost all agree, is ineffective because reform is so unlikely that commitment
of the required resources and political capital would be the paradigm of
throwing good money after bad. In the meantime, CMS tinkers with the
Nursing Home Compare Five-Star Quality Rating System, continuing to assert
that the System relies on objective and valid survey data219 and announces
initiatives to tie Medicare payment to quality of care,220 despite that it cannot
effectively measure quality, at least in nursing facilities.
To be sure, in the early years after the adoption of the Medicare and
Medicaid Acts, there were serious obstacles impeding the design and
development of an effective means of assessing and enforcing quality in
nursing facilities.221 As a federal official directly involved in the effort
explained around the time that OBRA ’87 was adopted:
During the early part of the decade, congressional hearings, research, and
discussion contributed to a growing body of concern and knowledge about the
nature and regulation of nursing homes. Concurrently, the Federal Government
was attempting to develop new sets of regulations. Two particular efforts are
worthy of note: the attempt in 1980 to issue regulations that contained new
standards for facilities to meet and the attempt in 1982 to issue new
enforcement regulations.
[A] detailed explanation of all of the provisions of these regulatory
proposals is of little interest. The significance of these proposals is in their
failure. They proved that the Federal Government, for a myriad of reasons, was
unable to establish sufficient consensus to reregulate [sic] the nursing home
industry. The various conflicting forces, including consumer, industry, and
State government, made it, in effect, impossible for the Federal Government to
222
establish a reasonable, respectable set of proposed regulations.

More bluntly, the needs of nursing facility residents took a backseat to CMS’
institutional political considerations and to the agency’s inability—or
unwillingness—to lead from the front.

218. See Morford, supra note 8, at 129 -130.
219. See, e.g., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Fact Sheet: Nursing Home Compare
3.0: Revisions to the Nursing Home Compare 5-Star Rating System (Feb. 12, 2015).
220. See Sylvia Matthews Burwell, Progress Towards Better Care, Smarter Spending,
Healthier People (Jan.26, 2015) http://www.hhs.gov/blog/2015/01/26/progress-towards-bettercare-smarter-spending-healthier-people.html.
221. See, e.g., Morford, supra note 8, at 129.
222. See Id. at 129 -130.
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Some nursing facility residents, however, had grown tired of CMS playing
political “rope-a-dope” with the survey process. Federal litigation challenging
the legality of the nursing facility inspection process was instituted in the early
1980s, ultimately leading to several court orders that CMS develop and
implement a survey process that accurately assessed the quality of nursing
facility care.
In what might, in retrospect, be seen as a prequel to the last couple of
decades, CMS repeatedly refused to comply with the court orders. Indeed, the
agency’s persistent refusal to develop and implement a valid nursing facility
quality assessment tool led to the Secretary of HHS being held in contempt of
court.223 The case is a cautionary tale for anyone who hopes that CMS will
voluntarily fulfill its obligations to test and validate any time soon.
Initially, the District Court dismissed the case, holding that it lacked
authority to compel defendants to develop and implement a new inspection
methodology.224 In 1984, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.
Based upon the Court’s detailed review of the Medicaid Act as a whole,
the Tenth Circuit held that the Act imposed a duty on the Secretary of HHS “to
promulgate regulations which will enable her to be informed as to whether
facilities receiving federal Medicaid funds are actually providing high quality
medical care.”225 The Tenth Circuit further held that the duty to develop and
utilize a survey system that validly assessed the actual quality of nursing home
care was so clear and unequivocal that mandamus was the appropriate
remedy.226
In 1985, the District Court, on remand, ordered CMS to use the formal
notice and comment rulemaking procedures provided by the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) to adopt a survey process that assessed the quality of the
care actually provided.227 On June 13, 1986, CMS promulgated the first of a
series of “final” regulations.228 The new Patient Care and Services (PaCS)
survey was described as outcome-oriented because compliance with federal
standards was determined by the “facility’s success in providing . . . care.”229
The Smith plaintiffs challenged the “final” survey rule, arguing that CMS
had not complied with the Tenth Circuit’s mandate or with the District Court’s

223. See Quality of Long-Term Care: Hearing on S. 1108 Before the Senate Subcomm. on
Health of the Comm. on Finance, 100th Cong. 51, 52 (1987) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 1108];
see also Estate of Smith v. Heckler, 557 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1983), rev’d, 747 F.2d 583, 591
(10th Cir. 1984), on remand 622 F. Supp. 403 (D. Colo. 1987).
224. Heckler, 557 F. Supp. at 299.
225. Heckler, 747 F. 2d at 591.
226. Id.
227. Heckler, 622 F.Supp. at 412.
228. See 51 Fed. Reg. 21,550 (June 13, 1986).
229. See, e.g., 59 Fed. Reg. at 56,231.
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order to publish a valid survey protocol in binding regulations.230 Because the
regulations did not include “the guidelines and forms which constitute the
[survey] system,” or the “details of the [survey] methodology,” the District
Court agreed and held that defendants had not complied, substantively or
procedurally, with the Tenth Circuit’s mandate.231 The Court held that the
Secretary’s refusal to be bound by specific, defined survey procedures,
guidelines and forms was a dereliction of the duty imposed by the Medicaid
Act.232
The District Court further found:
There is no legislative definition of ‘quality health care,’ and there can be
none. It is something which emanates from the process of regulation. The
methodology prescribed is the vehicle by which the Secretary will become
‘informed as to whether the nursing facilities are actually providing high
quality medical care.’ Thus, the method is the medium both for defining the
expected level of care and for determining performance . . . .
The Secretary needs to adequately define and guide the state surveyors’
functions to ensure that there is uniformity in evaluating the delivery of health
care. Uniform guidelines are imperative for achieving that goal . . . .
The failure of the Rule to include the specifics of the PaCS survey system also
raises a procedural due process concern . . . . [A] facility adversely affected by
findings of deficiency may successfully challenge enforcement because of a
failure to give adequate notice of what is required or expected. There is merit
in the argument that the failure to include sufficient detail in the regulation
may preclude adequate enforcement under commonly accepted principles of
233
fundamental fairness.

The court once again ordered CMS to engage in formal APA rulemaking.234
Notably, the Tenth Circuit and the District Court were not alone in
perceiving the need for binding survey regulations. During congressional
hearings, in contrast to the Secretary’s long-standing opposition to
promulgating the survey protocol as a formal rule,235 the IOM advised that, to
promote consistency in survey results, the survey protocols and methodologies
should be issued in regulations and consolidated in one location in the Code of
Federal Regulations.236

230. See Smith v. Bowen, 656 F. Supp. 1093, 1094 (D. Colo. 1987).
231. Id. at 1099.
232. Id. at 1096.
233. Id. at 1097 (citations omitted).
234. Id.
235. See, e.g., Medicare & Medicaid Programs; Survey, Certification, and Enforcement of
Skilled Nursing Facilities and Nursing Facilities, 59 Fed. Reg. at 56,120.
236. IOM REPORT, supra note 6, at 32, 111. See also Hearing on S. 1108, supra note 223, at
23.
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In July 1987, CMS published the second “final” rule in the series.237 The
survey procedures, forms and guidelines were offered for comment in an
appendix, but, despite the courts’ orders, still were not part of the binding, final
rule and would not be published in the Code of Federal Regulations.238 Despite
several court orders to the contrary, CMS continued to maintain that adoption
of the forms, procedures and standards as a rule was undesirable because
modifying them to reflect “changes and improvements” would be “slow and
difficult.”239
The court again disagreed. Reiterating the earlier ruling of the Tenth
Circuit, and echoing IOM’s concern for consistency, the District Court again
held:
To become and remain informed, the Secretary must establish uniform
standards for facility performance and a uniform methodology for evaluating
that performance to ensure the delivery of high quality health care. Thus, the
240
regulations required for these purposes must be prescriptive and legislative.

The District Court this time found the Secretary in contempt of court. The
defendants were ordered to “take new action to promulgate a rule establishing
standards of care and the methodology, forms and directions for the states’
survey certification process.”241
In December 1987, seemingly despairing of CMS’ ability to reform the
nursing home regulatory system and expressing skepticism about whether
defendants would “eventually publish new regulations,” Congress adopted the
Nursing Home Reform Act that was included in OBRA ’87.242 OBRA ’87
enacted into substantive law many of IOM’s recommendations.243
CMS treated the adoption of OBRA ’87 as an opportunity to avoid
compliance with the Smith courts’ orders and moved the court for relief from
the prior orders. The District Court disagreed, however, ruling that the orders
requiring that the inspection procedures, forms, and methodology must be
promulgated as binding regulations, “are not in any way inconsistent with the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987[.]”244 According to the District

237. 52 Fed. Reg. 24,752 (July 1, 1987).
238. See 52 Fed. Reg. at 24,760.
239. See Smith v. Bowen, 675 F. Supp. 586, 589 (D. Colo. 1987).
240. Id. at 589.
241. Id. at 590.
242. H.R. Rep. No. 100-391(I), at 452 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1, 2313272. See also Hearing on S. 1108, supra note 223, at 51, 52; Ex. 30; Morford, supra note 8, at
130 (discussing defendants’ inability “to establish sufficient consensus to regulate” nursing
homes and defendants’ failure “during the last 10 years” to issue new nursing home regulations).
243. H.R. Rpt. No.100-391(I), 100th Cong., 1st Sess., P452, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2313-1 at 2313-272 (IOM Report is the “starting point” for OBRA ‘87); Ex. 14, IOM 2001 at
142.
244. Smith v. Bowen, No. CIV-75-M-539, 1988 WL 235574, at *1 (D. Colo. Feb. 18, 1988).
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Court, “[t]he passage of OBRA [’87] in no way modifies or preempts the
Tenth Circuit’s decision.”245
On June 17, 1988, almost one year after OBRA ’87 was adopted and four
years after first being ordered to do so, defendants promulgated regulations
containing nursing home survey forms, procedures and guidelines that had
been in the development process prior to OBRA ’87.246 After fighting the need
for prescriptive regulations, in the preamble, CMS explained that OBRA ’87
had “ratif[ied] items included in [the] proposed regulations” so that any OBRA
’87 related change in the survey process would be in the nature of “necessary
refinements to the survey process forms and guidelines.”247
Notwithstanding the statement that future developments would be “in the
nature of necessary refinements,” CMS adopted new and different survey
forms, protocols, procedures, and methodologies to implement OBRA ’87.
Despite the Smith courts’ holdings, the OBRA ’87 survey forms, procedures,
and protocols are not contained in the regulations, but, for the most part, are
found in CMS’ State Operations Manual.
The survey procedures, forms and methodologies adopted by defendants in
June 1988 never have been repealed. To the contrary, the 1988 survey rules
still are codified in the Code of Federal Regulations and are the only survey
procedures, forms, and protocol promulgated through formal notice and
comment rulemaking.248 Those regulations are not followed, however. Despite
taking the position that OBRA ’87 had ratified those regulations and that the
regulations conformed so closely to OBRA ’87 that only “refinements” would
be necessary, CMS subsequently began to assert that the regulations were
“obsoleted” by the passage of OBRA ’87. Moreover, CMS makes the assertion
despite the fact that the Administrative Procedure Act expressly provides that
the amendment, repeal, or modification of an existing rule requires formal
notice and comment rulemaking by the agency proposing the change.249
B.

The Consequences of the Failure to “Test and Validate.”

Almost twenty-five years after OBRA ’87 was adopted, the statutory
mandate that quality be assessed: (1) based on resident outcomes; and (2) using
a protocol that had been tested and validated prior to implementation remains
to be realized. The government’s own reports and studies recognize that survey
results remain inaccurate, invalid and inconsistent on the whole.
The story, however, is not entirely one of failure. It is fair to say, that most
people believe the substantive quality standards promulgated to implement

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id.
See 53 Fed. Reg. 22,850 (June 17, 1988) (codified at 42 C.F.R. Part 488, Subpart C).
Id. at 22,853.
See 42 C.F.R. Subpart C.
5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2012).
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OBRA ’87 are both appropriate and, indeed, largely well done. Similarly, there
appears to be widespread belief that the structure of the remedial process is
likewise generally appropriate. Ultimately, the problem is that the detection
methodology—the third leg of the stool of effective enforcement—is so
problematic that it compromises the integrity, and undermines the utility, of the
survey and enforcement process.
The OIG, GAO, and other government studies and reports address the
problems of the survey process using an antiseptic, theoretical, and philosophic
public policy approach that ignores the real-world implications of CMS’
failures for nursing facility residents, providers, and caregivers. Instead, as
illustrated by the government reports’ recent, near exclusive focus on
understatement of deficiencies to the exclusion of possible overstatement,
CMS seems driven by a political goal to appear tough on violators, rather than
the desire to fix the systemic problems with the survey process and achieve
across-the-board accuracy and consistency. That is not a value-neutral choice;
to the contrary, it has consequences that undermine effective enforcement and
facility-based performance improvement efforts.
Individual residents and families seeking safe and effective nursing facility
care for themselves or for loved ones have virtually nothing other than
anecdotes and the survey results to guide their choice of a nursing facility. Yet,
notwithstanding the uniform results of government studies responsible
government officials continue to represent that those results are trustworthy
and reliable because they are “data from onsite inspections conducted by
trained, objective surveyors from state public health departments and CMS.”250
Such statements may be politically expedient, but they are grossly misleading
and a betrayal of the public trust.
The deception foisted upon prospective nursing facility residents and their
family members is exacerbated because the government—despite the findings
of its own studies—publicly endorses the utility of such findings and
repeatedly encourages consumers to rely on survey results when choosing
among nursing facilities. Indeed, by incorporating and endorsing survey results
as “the core of the Nursing Home Compare 5 Star rating system [sic],”251 the
government affirmatively represents that such results are valid, accurate, and
an appropriate basis on which individuals should decide which nursing
facilities are most likely to provide safe and effective care.
The plethora of government and government-sponsored studies
demonstrating the unreliability and inconsistency of survey results suggests
that, in a commercial context, similar representations would be an actionable,

250. OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: ADMINISTRATION
ANNOUNCES NEW EXECUTIVE ACTIONS TO IMPROVE QUALITY OF CARE FOR MEDICARE
BENEFICIARIES (2014).
251. Id.
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misleading, unfair, or deceptive trade practice. In addition, once admitted to a
nursing facility, residents and their families justifiably view the survey process
as providing assurance that quality of care will be maintained. That, too, is an
illusion. The government’s studies and reports effectively acknowledge that
the survey can provide no such assurance.
The flaws in the survey process are equally problematic for care providers.
To be effective, as IOM and many others recognize, a regulatory system must
be based on valid, accurate assessment of quality. Indeed, IOM anticipated the
current situation: a regulatory system that fails to prioritize those values lacks
integrity, and ultimately will be disrespected and ignored, if not the subject of
derision.252 Likewise, a regulatory system characterized by arbitrary and
capricious results will be resented, as is the nursing facility survey in many
quarters, and viewed to be something to be tolerated or avoided rather than a
means to improve, or guarantee, performance.253 Moreover, such a regulatory
system is a strong disincentive discouraging the professional administrators
and caregivers needed to provide quality nursing facility services from entering
or remaining in the field.
Indeed, rather than encouraging pursuit of aspirational performance goals
such as those embodied in the substantive performance standards imposed by
OBRA ’87,254 the nursing facility survey system and regulatory system have

252. Abt’s Final Report made a similar observation. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 66.
253. See J. Scott-Cawiezell, et al., Moving from a Culture of Blame to a Culture of Safety in
the Nursing Home Setting, 41(3) NURSING FORUM 133 (2006).
254. The aspirational nature of OBRA’s performance standards are evident from both the
statutory language establishing such criteria and from the regulations and manuals implementing
the statute. The regulation that implements OBRA’s quality of care criteria for nursing homes
participating in the Medicare and Medicaid programs provides: “Each resident must receive and
the facility must provide the necessary care and services to attain or maintain the highest
practicable physical, mental, and psychosocial well-beingFalse” 42 C.F.R. § 483.25 (2014). See
also 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(b)(2)(2012) . CMS’s State Operations Manual states that: “‘Highest
practicable physical, mental, and psychosocial well-being’ is defined as the highest possible level
of functioning and well-being, limited by the individual’s recognized pathology and the normal
aging process.” CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., STATE OPERATIONS MANUAL,
APPENDIX PP, GUIDANCE TO SURVEYORS 159 (Rev. 133, 2015), available at https://www.cms.
gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/downloads/som107ap_pp_guidelines_ltcf.pdf.
These requirements obligate a nursing facility to “ensure that the resident obtains optimal
improvement or does not deteriorate within the limits of a resident’s right to refuse treatment, and
within the limits of recognized pathology and the normal aging process.” Id.
That OBRA imposes an aspirational standard of care rather than defining the minimally
acceptable level of performance is evident. First, the federal standards do not employ the familiar,
comparative or community-based assessment that asks whether a facility provided the care and
services that comparable providers in the same or similar community would have provided in the
same or similar circumstances. To the contrary, the performance of similarly situated facilities is
irrelevant. Instead, compliance with the OBRA standard is determined by focusing exclusively on
whether the care delivered met the needs of each individual nursing facility resident. Third, the
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institutionalized a regulatory culture of blame that impedes development a
culture of safety in nursing facilities.255 When a regulated entity believes that
accurate assessment is not the primary goal of the regulatory system, or, at
least, consistently likely, the regulatory system becomes an impediment to
quality improvement.
No regulatory system can be effective where as here, government
regulators operate on a dual track system that effectively excuses the
government’s failure to comply with statutory mandates but holds nursing
facilities to a zero tolerance performance standard.256 The survey inspection
process also has come to be held in disrespect because of the appearance, if not
the reality, that federal regulators respond—as was the case with the Nursing
Home Compare and QIS—to the opportunity to score political points even in
the face of evidence that the survey process is seriously flawed.257
The state regulators and inspectors who actually perform the bulk of
nursing facility inspections are likewise placed in an impossible position. The
disrespect in which the survey process is held and the perceived lack of
integrity of the process create tension and adversity between the providers and
the regulators who are the face of the process. That daily tension—along with
the fact that the survey and enforcement system is, at bottom, punitive, rather
than improvement oriented—makes it difficult, if not impossible, for providers

determination whether the regulatory standard was met is not based on the reasonableness of the
provider’s actions, but, instead, is based on whether each resident achieved optimal physical,
mental, and psychosocial status.
255. See Jill Scott-Cawiezell et al., supra note 254, at 133, 138. See also Alice F. Bonner et
al., Patient Safety Culture: A Review of the Nursing Home Literature and Recommendations for
Practice, 16 ANNALS OF LONG-TERM CARE, March 2008, available at http://www.annalsoflong
termcare.com/article/8425. (“Nursing homes are driven in part by a punitive regulatory
environment, governed by regulations from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
(CMS), and each state’s Department of Public Health . . . Certain principles of [Patient Safety
Culture] that apply to other industries or to hospitals, such as a fair and just culture versus a
culture of blame, may not resonate with nursing homes as they are currently structured.” Further
noting that “an open environment around error reporting does not exist in nursing homes. Given
the punitive nature of the state survey process, this is not surprising. Efforts to reconcile
enforcement of regulation with encouragement of open communication and error reporting in
nursing homes is warranted.”).
256. Compare 42 C.F.R. § 442.30(a) (2014) (provider agreement is not valid evidence of
compliance with certification requirements if the survey agency “failed to use the Federal
standards, and the forms, methods, and procedures prescribed by CMS as required under §
431.610 (f)(1) or 488.318(b) of this chapter, for determining the qualifications of providers”),
with 42 C.F.R. § 488.318 (2014) (Failure to [u]se Federal standards, protocols, and the forms,
methods, and procedures specified by CMS . . . does not . . . [i]nvalidate adequately documented
deficiencies.”), and 42 C.F.R. § 488.305 (1) (2014) (“The State survey agency’s failure to follow
the procedures set forth in this section [regarding the conduct of surveys] will not invalidate
otherwise legitimate determinations that a facility’s deficiencies exist.”).
257. CMS MILESTONES, supra note 214, at 16.
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and regulators to cooperate in what should be a joint effort to pursue a shared
goal of improving quality. When survey results are modified or citations
eliminated at the rates previously discussed, state inspectors and supervisors,
just as the providers, lose respect for the survey system, lack confidence in its
integrity, and ultimately come to doubt whether what they do actually
improves nursing facility performance.
Conducting a nursing home or nursing facility survey is a difficult task in
any circumstance. It is made even more difficult when the known defects in the
protocol undermine the validity of the results and encourage disrespect for the
system as well as for those who apply and enforce the regulations. In such
circumstances, the effectiveness of the process is undermined by regulatory
fatigue that causes inspectors increasingly to see themselves as performing an
ultimately futile and ineffective task.258 It should surprise no one that there is a
chronic shortage of surveyors.
In an article published in 1988, a senior federal official responsible for
oversight of the survey process stated his opinion that, as a result of OBRA
’87, “the nursing home problem has now been fixed through legislation.”259
With the benefit of the “retrospectoscope” it can confidently be said that the
prediction was both premature and unjustifiably optimistic.
The almost thirty-year old promise of OBRA ’87 has been broken because
responsible federal officials, rather than implement the mandate of the statute,
continued, as before adoption of OBRA ’87, to respond to the demands of a
dysfunctional political system and to pursue their own agendas. Similarly,
nursing home industry and resident advocates, as well as well-regarded social
scientists, and public health policy commentators have accepted the failure to
implement the statute’s mandates, rather than holding public officials
accountable. Indeed, some well-regarded notable researchers have asserted, as
have highly placed public officials, that the survey data are in fact accurate and
sufficiently reliable to be used by consumers, in enforcement actions, public
health research, analysis, and policy formulation.260 Likewise, industry and

258. See, e.g., Patricia A Butler, Assuring the Quality of Care and Life in Nursing Homes:
The Dilemma of Enforcement, 57 N. CAR. L. REV. 1317, 1327-30 (1979); See also Lee et al.,
supra note 213, at 772 n. 6. (“Dissatisfaction with the survey process is wide-spread. Resident
advocacy groups stress that state survey teams often miss important problems with care and fail
to respond to complaints quickly . . . . Surveyors question the integrity of the inspection, political
pressures to water down inspection findings, and the effectiveness of the enforcement process
. . . . Industry representatives agree that the current survey and enforcement system “is an entirely
subjective, process oriented snapshot inspection system that focuses on punishment – not
quality”).
259. Morford, supra note 8, at 129, 132.
260. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET:
ADMINISTRATION ANNOUNCES NEW EXECUTIVE ACTIONS TO IMPROVE QUALITY OF CARE FOR
MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES (Oct. 6, 2014) (“[O]nsite inspections form the core of the [5-Star]
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resident advocates use survey data to support their own perspectives. So long
as that situation continues, the interests of nursing facility residents will be, at
least secondary, and it is unlikely that the goals set forth in IOM’s 1986 study
and incorporated into OBRA ’87 ever will be achieved.261
In 1984, the Tenth Circuit, in a lengthy opinion, had to parse numerous
provisions of the Medicaid Act to find CMS’s duty to adopt and utilize a
survey protocol that accurately assessed the quality of nursing facility care. In
OBRA ’87, Congress made such painstaking piecework unnecessary. Congress
wrote the agency’s duty into the statute in clear and unequivocal language and,
lest there be any residual doubt, Congress summarized that obligation in a
single, explicit provision that makes clear that the needs of nursing home
residents, not administrative convenience or political expediency, ought to be
the touchstone:
It is the duty and the responsibility of the Secretary to assure that the
requirements which govern the provision of care in skilled nursing facilities
under this subchapter, and the enforcement of such requirements are adequate
to protect the health, safety, welfare, and rights of the residents and to promote
262
the effective and efficient use of public moneys.

Just as was the case with the Smith court’s orders, CMS seems determined to
ignore the obligations created by the statute and to continue the pattern begun
in the 1980s. Almost thirty years after OBRA ’87 was adopted, it is long past
time for the Secretary to fulfill her duty.
rating system”; quality of care information is “based on data from onsite inspections conducted
by trained, objective surveyors from state public health departments and CMS.”); Christiana
Williams et al., Measuring Nursing Home Quality – The Five-Star Rating System, SAS GLOBAL
FORUM (2010) at 4, available at http://support.sas.com/resources/papers/proceedings10/1612010.pdf. (“CMS wanted the health inspection domain to play a predominant role in determining
the overall 5-star rating. The main reason for this is that, unlike the staffing and quality measures
domains which are based on data self-reported by nursing homes, independent surveyors carry
out the health inspection; thus, the data should be more objective and unbiased.”); C. Harrington
et al., The Regulation and Enforcement of Federal Nursing Home Standards, 1991-1997 56 MED.
CARE RES. REV., Dee. 1999, at 474. (“The deficiency data. . . are recorded by state surveyors
after they determine whether the facility has met, or has not met, each standard. These data are
considered accurate because they are reviewed carefully by [CMS] and subject to challenges by
nursing facilities.”).
261. See, e.g. Lee et al, supra note 213, at 779. (“Yahoo! Reports that “Nursing Home
Compare” is the nation’s second most popular nursing home care sites and in some of the most
frequently visited sections of the Medicare Web site . . . . [Thus], the reliability of nursing home
surveys becomes an even more visible public policy issue. Survey results will have the greatest
impact on nursing home quality if consumers and the industry believe that deficiencies are valid,
reliable measures of quality. This belief will be undercut by variations in the number, scope, and
severity of deficiencies when the facts are held constant. The appropriate policy response is to
acknowledge these variations and address them by clarifying definitions and interpretations, by
improving training, and by providing feedback to surveyors.”).
262. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(f)(1) (2012).

